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ROBBING A BARREN VAULT: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF DUKES V WAL-MART FOR
CASES CHALLENGING SUBJECTIVE
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
Elizabeth Tippett*
I. INTRODUCTION

Although ostensibly about civil procedure, the Supreme Court
decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart garnered considerable attention from the

media, businesses, and commentators alike.

It was the largest

employment class action lawsuit in American history, consisting of

approximately 1.5 million women nationwide challenging Wal-Mart's
subjective promotion and compensation practices under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.' A district court first certified the class in 2004, which
was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in 2007 and en banc in 2010.2
In June 2011, the Supreme Court ruled that Dukes had not satisfied

the commonality requirement for asserting a class action under Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 The Chamber of Commerce
immediately issued a press release declaring it "the most important class
action case in more than a decade." 4 By contrast, the Christian Science
* Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. I thank Mohsen Manesh, Michael
Moffitt, Michelle McKinley, John Greenman, Carl Bjerre, and the other faculty members at the
University of Oregon who provided comments and feedback during a presentation in October 2011.
Thanks also to Michael Harper, Erik Girvan, Alex Long, Gregg Polsky, John Conley, and Holly
Holloway for their questions and comments. Any mistakes or inaccuracies in this article are
entirely my own.
1. Richard T. Ford, Everyday Discrimination: Why the Wal-Mart Sex-Bias Lawsuit is the
Most Important Case the Supreme Court Will Hear This Year, SLATE (Mar. 28, 2011, 1:49 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news and._politics/jurisprudence/2011/03/everydaydiscrimination.ht
ml.
2. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2549 (2011).
3. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2556-57.
4. Press Release, U.S. Chamber Applauds Supreme Court Ruling in Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. (June 20, 2011), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/20 1/june/us-chamber-applauds-supreme-court-rulingwal-mart-v-dukes.
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Monitor called the case "a major blow to working women" and a "sign
that some of the esteemed judges on our nation's highest court need a
primer in how contemporary discrimination functions." 5 In an interview
on National Public Radio, a prominent plaintiffs lawyer called the case
"a disaster not only for civil rights litigations but for anyone who wants
to bring a class action," and commented "[t]he five-male majority
,,6
decision today represents a jaw-dropping form of judicial activism.
Why the fuss over a procedural technicality? Interest in the case as
a matter of substantive employment law is perhaps best summarized by
commentator Melissa Hart:
"[e]mployment discrimination law is at a crossroads, and Wal-Mart is
planted squarely at its juncture ....its assault on the subjective
decisions made as a consequence of Wal-Mart's delegation - raises a
question that has lurked behind Title VII litigation for years: What
responsibility should employers take for gender stereotypes and biases
that pervade United States
' 7 culture when the effects of those cultural
norms are felt at work?"
The Supreme Court's answer was a setback to the plaintiff s bar - a
system of delegated decision-making that produces large statistical
disparities cannot furnish the requisite commonality to support a class
action, even where the corporate culture is infected by gender
stereotypes. It was also problematic for those who view subjective
decision-making as the prime suspect for continued discrimination in the
workplace due to its susceptibility to unconscious bias and subtle
stereotype.
In this article, I use empirical methods to predict the likely impact
of Dukes v. Wal-Mart on cases seeking to challenge subjective
employment practices in federal court. To do so, I examined all of the
federal court opinions from 2005 to mid-2011 challenging an employer's
subjective decision-making practice under a disparate impact or "pattern
or practice" disparate treatment theory under Title VII or the ADEA. I
choose this timeframe to approximate the period in which the district
5. Courtney E. Martin, Op-Ed., Wal-Mart v. Dukes ruling is out of sync with 21st"-century
22,
2011),
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(June
sex
discrimination,
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/0622/Wal-Mart-v.-Dukes-ruling-is-out-ofsync-with-2 1st-century-sex-discrimination/(page)/2.
6. Nina Totenberg, Top Court Rules In Favor Of Wal-Mart, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, (June 20,
2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/06/20/137304956/top-court-rules-in-favor-of-wal-mart
(quoting David Sanford).
7. Melissa Hart, Learningfrom Wal-Mart 2-3 (U. Colo. L. Sch. Legal Stud. Res. Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 06-36, 2006).
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court and Ninth Circuit's decision to certify the class in Wal-Mart
remained good law.
My research suggests that the effect of Wal-Mart will be more
limited than its portrayal in the media would suggest. First, results
suggest that cases challenging subjective employment practices were
very uncommon even prior to the Wal-Mart decision. An average
employer's litigation risk in connection with such claims was so
vanishingly small during the 2005-2011 time frame that I surmise that
few employers adopted measures or altered their behavior to address this
litigation risk. As a result, the employer-favorable ruling in Wal-Mart
simply reaffirms the status quo as it relates to employer practices.
Results also suggest, however, that the risk of a lawsuit challenging
subjective employment practices was not homogenous across all
employers. From 2005-2011, Fortune 100 companies faced a substantial
risk - about 15% - of being subject to such a suit. These lawsuits could
best be described as "copycat ' '8 Wal-Mart claims. They typically
involved very large nationwide classes where the facts and the theory of
the case were nearly identical to those alleged in Wal-Mart. Their
similarity to Wal-Mart likely means that this particular breed of lawsuit
will no longer be viable under the standard articulated in the Supreme
Court opinion.
Nevertheless, I find that about half of the previously successful
class action claims 9 challenging subjective employment practices may
still be viable post Dukes v. Wal-Mart. These cases were typically more
circumscribed than the copycat Wal-Mart claims, involving class sizes in
the hundreds rather than thousands, and damages in the millions rather
than tens of millions. They also tended to involve more aggravated facts
patterns than the copycat claims, suggesting that their continued viability
serves a valuable public purpose.
Lastly, results revealed a particularity in the way in which disparate
impact lawsuits challenging subjective employment practices were
litigated from 2005 - 2011. In all but one of the disparate impact cases I
reviewed, the employer did not assert its affirmative defense that its
practices were job related and consistent with business necessity. They
failed to do so despite favorable Supreme Court jurisprudence
suggesting the defense could be asserted in cases involving subjective
8. The term "copycat" is not entirely precise, in that some of the suits may have predated
the Wal-Mart case. If a case was filed prior to 2004 but resulted in a published or unpublished
decision between 2005 and 2011, it was included in my sample.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 129-133 for a discussion of how I define the term
success."
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claims without resort to complex scientific job validation procedures.10
As a result, the plaintiff in each case was never required to show that a
less discriminatory alternative selection procedure was available prior to
settling the case, sometimes for tens of millions of dollars and extensive
injunctive relief.
While numerous commentators have maligned subjective
employment practices as the scourge of the modem workplace, I argue
that employment practices cannot be evaluated in isolation. Rather, they
are only good or bad when compared to alternative selection procedures
available in a particular context. Alternatives to subjective practices such as testing - have historically been the source of considerable
adverse impact, and may continue to result in significant disparities.
Because the availability of better alternatives was never litigated in the
Wal-Mart copycat lawsuits now precluded by the Supreme Court's
decision, it is difficult to assess their importance as a matter of public
policy.
Section II of this article provides an overview of how scholars have
characterized the particular problem of subjective decision-making and
its application to the facts alleged in Wal-Mart. Section III places WalMart within existing jurisprudence regarding class certification, and
explains how Wal-Mart imposes additional barriers to certification in
Section IV describes my
cases challenging subjective practices.
methodology, and Section V analyzes the results. Lastly, Section VI
discusses whether Congress should override Wal-Mart and whether
other reforms would have a more substantial impact on the prevalence of
claims challenging subjective employment practices.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Commentators have devoted considerable discussion to the issue of
subjective decision-making as a potent vehicle for modern
discrimination. 1
These commentators argue that "[c]ognitive bias,
10. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459-60 (2001) ("Smoking guns - the sign on the door that
'Irish need not apply' or the rejection explained by the comment that 'this is no job for a woman'are largely things of the past.... Cognitive bias, structures of decisionmaking, and patterns of
interaction have replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier of much continued
inequality"); Audrey J. Lee, UnconsciousBias Theory in Employment DiscriminationLitigation, 40
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 482, 496 (2005); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and
Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 741 (2005) [hereinafter, Hart, Subjective
Decisionmaking]; Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias 3-6 (Pub. Law &

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss2/5

4

Tippett: Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implication of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for

2012]

ROBBING A BARREN VAULT

structures of decisionmaking, and patterns of interaction have replaced
deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier of much continued
inequality."' 12 Recent scholarly interest in the relationship between
employment law and cognitive bias has grown following
groundbreaking social science research by Anthony Greenwald,
Mahzarin Banaji, and Brian Nosek. They tested the presence of
unconscious stereotyping, termed "implicit bias," by measuring the
speed with which test subjects associated stereotypical and counter-3
stereotypical words with categories, such as race and gender.'
Subsequent studies of implicit bias suggest that approximately 75% of
individuals studied demonstrate implicit bias favoring "relatively
14
advantaged group[s]" over disadvantaged groups.
Commentators theorize that implicit bias and other subtle
stereotypes may be responsible for ongoing workplace disparities in
gender and race. 15 They argue that implicit bias operates through
subjective decision-making.' 6 As Susan Sturm explained, "[djecisions
requiring the exercise of individual or collective judgment that are
highly unstructured tend to reflect, express, or produce biased outcomes.
This bias has been linked to patterns of underrepresentation or exclusion
of members of nondominant groups."' 17 Tristin Green argues that
subjective practices are increasingly prevalent as a result of a
restructuring of the workplace over the last several
fundamental
8
decades.'
Legal Theory Univ. of Chi. L. Sch., Working Paper No. 124, 2006); Anthony G. Greenwald &
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 947 (2006);
Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, FairMeasures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative
Action, " 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1078 (2006).
12. Sturm, supranote 11, at 460.
13. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 11, at 3-4 (describing the implicit association test).
14. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 11, at 955.
15. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995);
Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 11, at 965; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 11, at 5-6; Linda
Hamilton Krieger & Rebecca Hanner White, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in MultiActor Employment Decision Making 8, (CALIF. L. REV., Working Paper No. 45, 2000); Kang &
Banaji, supra note 11 at 1085 ("On subjective measures of merit, the perceiver's (evaluator's)
expectations guide what she actually sees in the target (the person being evaluated). In more plain
language, if we expect someone to be violent, we will likely see violence when presented with
ambiguous behavior."); Hart, supra note 7, at 15; Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking, supra note 11,
at 745-49.
16. Lee, supra note 11 at 487; Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social
Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 41,
50 (noting that favorable settlements typically follow class certification); Hart, supra note 7, at 14.
Sturm, supra note 1 at 485-86.
17.
18. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a StructuralAccount
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Many commentators have argued that antidiscrimination law fails
to address these more subtle forms of discrimination by demanding
evidence of discriminatory animus.1 9 A number have seized upon
disparate impact theory as a promising method for challenging subtle
discrimination under existing law because, unlike disparate treatment
claims, it does not require proof of discriminatory intent.2 0
It is within this context that Dukes v. Wal-Mart l has captured the
interest of commentators, businesses, and public policy groups alike.
Dukes consisted of a putative class of 1.5 million female Wal-Mart
employees nationwide, alleging discrimination on the basis of pay and
promotion. 22 Dukes alleged that women represented 72% of Wal-Mart's
hourly employees, but only 33% of Wal-Mart's managers. 23 Plaintiffs
also produced statistical evidence showing that women were promoted
more slowly than men.24 With respect to pay, Dukes alleged that women
were "paid less than men in comparable positions, despite having higher

of DisparateTreatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 91,104 (2003). See also Sturm, supra
note 11, at 469 ("Exclusion increasingly results not from an intentional effort formally to exclude,
but rather as a byproduct of ongoing interactions shaped by the structures of day-to-day decisionmaking and workplace relationships.")
19. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 11, at 14 n. 42 (reviewing scholarly literature critiquing
antidiscrimination law for failing to address implicit bias). See also Hart, Subjective
Decisionmaking, supra note 11, at 743; Erik J. Girvan & Grace Deason, A Question of Equal
Treatment: A Psychological Case for Abandoning the "Discriminatory Motive" Under Title VII 2
(2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing the judicially created disparate
treatment doctrine, based on a search for "discriminatory motive, as incoherent and proposing an
alternative framework that rejects discriminatory motive); Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic
DisparateTreatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395, 395 (2011).
20. Michael Selmi, Was Disparate Impact a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 704-05
(summarizing scholarship "offer[ing] numerous proposals to extend the disparate impact theory to
cure all manner of social ills.")
21. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct 2541 (2011), rev'g Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 603 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2010).
22. Id.at 2547.
23. First Amended Complaint at 1, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ). This disparity placed Wal-Mart significantly behind other
retailers, a fact Wal-Mart's executives acknowledged in an internal memorandum. Brief for
Respondents at 22, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277)
("Executive Vice President Coleman Peterson made regular presentations to top management about
the Company's workforce. Shortly before this case was filed, Peterson informed management that,
based upon the company's own internal benchmarking, 'Wal-Mart's women in management
percent ... is significantly behind several of the other retailers reporting... [Wal-Mart] trails both
the retail industry ...and workforce averages."') (ellipses in original).
24. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 154 (N.D. Cal. 2004). On average, WalMart promoted women to assistant manager after 4.38 years, compared to 2.86 for men. Id at 161.
Similarly, "it took 10.12 years for women to reach Store Manager, compared with 8.64 years for
men." Id.
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performance ratings and greater seniority[.],, 25 The pay disparity ranged
from 5 to 15% per year.26
Dukes brought both a disparate impact claim and a "pattern or
practice" disparate treatment claim against Wal-Mart. Dukes did not
allege that Wal-Mart's managers intentionally discriminated against
female employees, but rather, that the disparities were caused by pay and
promotion policies which "uniformly provide for managers to exercise
significant subjectivity in making pay and promotion decisions. 27
Although hourly positions were subject to a minimum starting wage,
store managers had the authority to raise compensation within a two
dollar per hour range unconstrained by oversight or objective criteria. 28
Likewise, Wal-Mart set a broad compensation range for its salaried
employees, within which district and regional managers were
given
29
complete discretion to determine compensation for subordinates.
With respect to promotions, vacancies were rarely posted, 30 and
participation in a management training program required a "tap on the
shoulder" from a manager to participate. 31 As a result, employees had
"no ability to apply for, or otherwise formally express their interest in,
openings as they arose", which "further intensit~ied] the subjective
nature of the promotion process. 32
To tie Wal-Mart's practices and the disparate statistical outcomes,
plaintiffs presented the testimony of Dr. William Bielby, a sociologist
and favored expert witness among plaintiffs attorneys.33 Dr. Bielby
described social science research providing that "gender stereotypes are
especially likely to influence personnel decisions when they are based on
subjective factors., 34 Bielby concluded that Wal-Mart's policy of
delegating subjective decision-making to managers with little oversight

25. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 474 F.3d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs' expert statistician
found that women were paid significantly less than men in each of Wal-Mart's forty-one regions.
Id. at 1228.
26. Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. at 156.
27. Id. at 145.
28. Id. at 146-47.
29. Id. at 147.
30. Id.
at 149.
31. Id. at 148.
32. Id. at 149.
33. See, e.g. Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 301, 327 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(accepting testimony of Dr. Bielby), Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1257, 1265 (N.D.
Cal. 1997) (accepting testimony of Dr. Bielby); EEOC v. Morgan Stanley, 324 F. Supp. 2d 451,
461-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (accepting testimony of Dr. Bielby); );Duling v. Gristede's Operating
Corp., 267 F.R.D. 86, 92, 93-94, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (accepting testimony of Dr. Bielby).
34. Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. at 153.
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rendered the company "vulnerable" to gender bias.35
Dukes' ambitious challenge of Wal-Mart's subjective practices
captured the attention of commentator Melissa Hart. Although the
central issue in Wal-Mart was class certification, Hart argued that such
an inquiry was inextricably tied to the merits of the case:
[T]he question of whether employees are affected by a common policy
[and] whether geographic dispersion should defeat certification is
fundamentally tied to a judgment about the appropriateness of suits
challenging the aggregate effects of decisions made through the
exercise of unguided discretion. Indeed, given that most class actions
that are certified settle before they go to trial, arguments about
[certification] ... may ' be
36 the closest that the courts get to truly
addressing [the merits]."
Commentator Tristin Green has taken a similar position, arguing
that Wal-Mart is emblematic of a legal trend in which "longstanding
theories of systemic discrimination are under attack" and an
"individualistic model of organizational wrongdoing.., has led to
under-theorizing, even mis-theorizing, of entity responsibility for
systemic disparate treatment., 37
Likewise, commentator Michael
Zimmer argues that Wal-Mart "can be viewed as a foreshadowing of the
38
undermining of the litigation structure of systemic discrimination law.,
Wal-Mart also garnered the attention of business and public interest
organizations. Twenty-eight amicus briefs were filed with the Supreme
Court, from stakeholders as diverse as the ACLU, the NAACP, the
United Food Workers, the US Women's Chamber of Commerce, Intel,
Costco, Bank of America, Fedex and Microsoft.3 9 Businesses argued
that "modem businesses regularly rely on centralized policies [but]
35. Id. at 154. Bielby did not, however, conduct any observational or other scientific studies
of Wal-Mart specifically, and could not "definitively state how regularly stereotypes play a
meaningful role in employment decisions." Id.
36. Melissa Hart, Symposium: Class and Collective Actions in Employment Law: Symposium
Editors: Douglas D. Scherer and Robert Belton: Learning From Wal-Mart, 10 EMP. RTs. &

EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 355, 384 (2006). Wal-Mart generated further scholarly debate as to the
admissibility of Bielby's testimony. See, e.g., John Monahan, Laurens Walker, & Gregory Mitchell,
ContextualEvidence of Gender Discrimination:The Ascendance of "Social Frameworks," 94 VA.

L. REv. 1715, 1745-46 (2008) (pondering the efficacy, reliability, and admissibility of social
framework testimony in the wake of Dukes).
37. Green, supra note 18, at 395.
38. MICHAEL J, ZIMMER, WAL-MART V. DUKES: TAKING THE PROTECTION OUT OF
PROTECTED CLASSES 40 (2006).

39. See Wal-Mart v. Dukes, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 16,2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/wal-mart-v-dukes/.
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delegated decision-making authority", suggesting that a finding in40
plaintiffs' favor would fundamentally alter the way they do business.
The US Women's Chamber of Commerce argued that women suffer
persistent disparities in compensation and advancement in the US
workplace, exacerbated by "corporations ... unable or unwilling to see
or acknowledge gender disparities. ' 4I Class actions, they argued, serve a
critical role in addressing social disparities, which "can force an internal
re-examination of executive attitudes and corporate culture. 42 The
NAACP argued that Wal-Mart sought to "impos[e] a series of
heightened [certification] standards on Plaintiffs' claims

...

[which]

would dramatically narrow
the circumstances in which the class action
43
vehicle could be used.,

In this article, I attempt to provide some concrete texture to the
debate on the likely impact of Wal-Mart by examining disparate impact
and pattern or practice cases challenging subjective employment
practices from 2005 to mid-2011. This period roughly approximates the
time period in which the District Court's decision to certify the class in
Dukes remained good law. 44
Commentators have periodically undertaken an empirical review of
disparate impact litigation. Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman compared the
prevalence of hiring and termination-related disparate impact claims in
federal courts between 1971 and 1995.45 More recently, Michael Selmi
reviewed all reported disparate impact cases in district and appellate
courts from six specific years spanning the period 1984 to 2001.46
Other commentators have discussed the viability of cases
challenging subjective practices under Title VII from a normative
standpoint. In a 2006 note, Daniel Klein examined the various ways in
which courts had addressed certification in the context of subjective

40. See Brief for Altria Group, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277).
41. Brief for US Women Chamber of Commerce et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 13, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277).
42. Id at 20.
43. Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. et. al. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 2, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277).

44. A federal court in California certified the class in June 2004, which the Ninth Circuit
affirmed in 2007, and again in an en banc decision in 2010. Although the District Court decision
certifying in the class was unpublished, many jurisdictions permit citations to unpublished
decisions.
45. See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q- Word as Red Herring: Why DisparateImpact
Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1492-93 (1996).

46.

See Selmi, supranote 20, at 738-39, tbls. A & B.
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decision-making practices. 47 Klein argued that such cases should only
be certified where the plaintiff presented robust and disaggregated
statistical proof - showing the existence of disparities at the level of the
decision-maker.48 A 2005 article by Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination,included a brief discussion of
the manner in which courts responded to class actions challenging
subjective employment practices.49 Like Klein, she concluded that
courts are divided in their treatment 0 Hart, however, argued that
judicial reluctance to certify such classes is frequently at odds with the
Supreme Court's "very explicit holding" in Watson v. Forth Worth that
such claims are actionable.5 1
In attempting to quantify the likely effect of Dukes v. Wal-Mart,
this paper seeks to provide an empirical answer 52 to a number of
questions left unaddressed in prior research. How prevalent are claims
challenging subjective employment practices, and are they successful in
doing so? What types of subjective practices are most commonly
challenged? What distinguishes a winning class action challenging
subjective practices from a losing one, and were courts already applying
standards similar to those articulated by the Supreme Court in WalMart? To what extent do successful class actions resemble the fact
patterns alleged in Wal-Mart? What is the average monetary value and
class size for successful class actions challenging subjective practices?
The answers may inform the ongoing debate as to whether existing law,
and the direction that law can be expected to proceed post-Wal-Mart,
adequately regulates the modem workplace.
III. DUKES V. WAL-MA4RT

AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS

In theory, the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart was a purely
procedural one. The question for which the Supreme Court granted
certiorari was whether the class certification ordered under Federal Rule

47. Daniel S. Klein, Note, Bridging the Falcon Gap: Do Claims of Subjective
Decisionmaking in Employment Discrimination Class Actions Satisfy the Rule 23(a) Commonality
and Typicality Requirements?, 25 REV. LITIG. 131, 133-34 (2006).

48.

See id at 176.

49.

Hart, supra note 11, at 778-88.

50.
51.

See id. at 781.
See id. at 783.

52.

See generally Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial

Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63 (2008) (describing a standard methodology for systematically
analyzing judicial opinions, recording consistent features of each, and drawing inferences about
their use and meaning).
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of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) was consistent with Rule 23(a).53 However,
the decision necessarily alters the course of Title VII jurisprudence
because the claims Dukes asserted are predominantly, and most
successfully, asserted on a class basis.
Dukes alleged disparate impact and a "pattern or practice" of
disparate treatment 54 under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.5 5 "Pattern
or practice" claims can be brought by the EEOC, which is exempt from
Rule 23's class certification requirements,56 or they can be brought on a
class wide basis. 7 Courts generally do not permit individuals to prove
disparate treatment solely through evidence of a "pattern or practice" of
discrimination.
Although disparate impact claims are available to individual
plaintiffs, such claims are rarely successful.5 8 This is largely a function
of the evidentiary rigors of a disparate impact claim, consisting of
aggregate statistics showing that an employer's facially neutral practice
had a disproportionately adverse impact on a protected group.59
53. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Wal-Martv. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No.
10-277). The Supreme Court also certified the question of"[w]hether claims for monetary relief can
be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)... and, if so, under what
circumstances." Id. The potential implications of the Supreme Court's answer to this second
question is beyond the scope of this paper. For an in-depth analysis of this issue, see generally
Suzette M. Malveaux, ClassActions at the Crossroads: An Answer to Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 5 HARv.
L. & POL'Y REV. 375 (2011).
54. Technically, a "pattern or practice" claim is not a separate cause of action from other
disparate treatment claims but a method of proving disparate treatment. Through a combination of
statistical and anecdotal evidence, the "pattern or practice" plaintiff must "establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination was the company's standard operating
procedure - the regular rather than the unusual practice." Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977). The plaintiff need not show that the employer discriminated against each
member of the class, but it must establish that a discriminatory policy or regular practice exists. Id.
at 360. The "mere occurrence of isolated or 'accidental' or sporadic discriminatory acts" is
insufficient. Id. at 336.
55. See Third Amended Complaint at
102-05, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, No. C-01-2252 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 12, 2002). Plaintiffs also alleged retaliation and hostile work environment claims. Id. at
110-11. Plaintiffs did not, however, include their retaliation and hostile work environment
claims in their motion for class certification. Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. at 142 n.4.
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(6)(a) (authorizing the EEOC to file a disparate treatment claim on
behalf of a group of employees alleging that the employer "is engaged in a pattern or practice of
resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights").
57. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876 n.9 (1984), EEOC v. Joe's
Stone Crab Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1286 (11 th Cir. 2000).
58. See Selmi, supra note 20, at 736 n.145 ("There are a surprising number of individual
claims, almost all of which fail.").
59. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd in part
401 U.S. 424 (1971). "Pattern or practice" claims are also frequently proven through statistics,
although courts will sometimes overlook deficiencies in statistical evidence when the plaintiff
proffers strong anecdotal evidence. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
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Gathering and analyzing such statistics requires extensive discovery and
expert testimony, which individual plaintiffs commonly fail to do.60
To the extent that the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart
imposes additional burdens or barriers to class certification of cases
challenging subjective practices, it can be expected to reduce the
prospects of success for disparate impact and "pattern or practice"
discrimination claims, as well as the accompanying settlement value of
such claims.6'
A. Class CertificationJurisprudencePriorto Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes class actions
available upon a showing of numerosity, commonality, typicality and
adequacy.62 Of these, commonality was the central issue in Wal-Mart63
64
- whether "there are questions of law or fact common to the class[.],,
Prior to Wal-Mart, district and appellate courts faced ambiguous
guidance as to plaintiffs burden in establishing commonality for claims
challenging subjective employment practices. 65 The only Supreme
form of a footnote in the 1982 case, General
Court guidance came in the
66
Telephone Co. v. Falcon.
Falcon involved a Mexican-American employee alleging a pattern

307 (1977) ("[w]here gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case
constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination."); Wright v. Stem, 450 F.
Supp. 2d 335, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Brown v. Nucor, 576 F.3d 149, 156-57 (4th Cir. 2009)
(evidence of racist remarks sufficient to support class certification, despite statistical evidence that
did not rise to the level of statistical significance).
60. See discussion infra p. 434-436.
61. This implication was not lost on the plaintiff's bar when Wal-Mart came before the
Supreme Court. In an amicus brief submitted to the Court, they argued that "view[ing] subjective
practices as inherently inconsistent with Rule 23's commonality requirement, or so much in tension
that only an extremely high level of proof allows certification, is as wrong as viewing them as
inherently inconsistent with disparate impact." Brief for National Employment Lawyers Association
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.
2541 (2011) (No. 10-277).
62. Specifically, the plaintiff must show that (a) "the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable" (numerosity); (b) "there are questions of law or fact common to the
class" (commonality); (c) "the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class" (typicality); and (d) "the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class" (adequacy). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
63. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550-51 (2011).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
65. See Klein, supra note 47, at 138 (referring to the prior Supreme Court guidance as
"oracular"); Hart, supra note 7, at 19-20.
66. 457 U.S. 147 (1982). See also Klein, supra note 47, at 140.
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or practice of discrimination in hiring and promotion.6 7 The plaintiff,
who had been denied a promotion, failed to make any factual allegations
regarding the employer's hiring practices. 68 While acknowledging that
racial discrimination is by definition class discrimination and that
"common questions of law or fact are typically present,, 69 the Supreme
Court stated:
"Conceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an individual's claim
that he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds, and
his otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a policy of
discrimination, and (b) the existence of a class of persons who have
suffered the same injury as that individual, such that the individual's
claim and the class claims will share common questions of law or70fact
and that the individual's claim will be typical of the class claims."
In a footnote, the Court observed that the plaintiff might have
bridged that gap had the plaintiff proffered "[slignificant proof that an
employer operated under a general policy of discrimination ...if the
discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion practices in the
same general fashion, such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking processes.'
The Supreme Court's guidance proved malleable in the hands of
district and appellate courts. Courts inclined to grant certification
focused on broad language in Falcon that "common questions of law or
fact are typically present" in race discrimination questions. 72 These
courts then tended to distinguish Falcon on its facts, and interpreted the
footnote to permit certification
through mere allegations of a policy or
73
practice extending class wide.

67. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 149.
68. Id.at 150.
69. Id. at 157.
70. Id.
71. Id.at 159 n.15. See also Klein, supra note 47, at 145-47 (discussing the Falcon
footnote).
72. See, e.g., Card v. City of Cleveland, 270 F.R.D. 280, 293-94 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (certifying
the common question of "whether Defendant's pattern or practice of utterly failing to promote
women to the position of WPO violates Title VII").
73. See, e.g., Cox v. American Case Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1558 (lith Cir. 1986)
(Distinguishing Falcon on its facts); Richardson v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1983)
(same). The Fourth and Fifth Circuits adopted this interpretation, opining that "the threshold
requirements of commonality and typicality are not high" and that mere "[a]llegations of similar
discriminatory employment practices, such as the use of entirely subjective personnel processes that
operate to discriminate, satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)." Shipes
v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1993); Brown v. Nucor, 576 F.3d 149, 153 (4th Cir.
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Other courts treated Falcon's "wide gap" language to impose an
evidentiary burden on plaintiffs at the certification stage.74 Courts also
cited the Falcon footnote for the proposition that a subjective decisionmaking practice must be "entirely subjective" to be certifiable.75
B. Additional Barriersto CertificationImposed by Dukes v. Wal-Mart
In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court settled the Falcon debate with an
extensive discussion of the commonality standard applicable to cases
challenging subjective employment practices. In doing so, it made
certification more difficult in two primary respects. First, it required the
plaintiff to show that the subjective practice at issue affected the class in
a uniform manner. Second, it declared that a policy of delegating
subjective decision-making authority cannot furnish the requisite
commonality for disparate impact claims or for pattern or practice
claims.
1. The Challenged Practice Must Affect the Class Uniformly
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia articulated the commonality
standard as follows:
"[t]heir claims must depend upon a common contention - for example,
the assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor.
That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is
capable of classwide resolution - which means that determination of
its truth or falsity will resolve an' 76issue that is central to the validity of
each of the claims in one stroke."

2009) (quoting Shipes with approval). Cases following this line of reasoning tend to simply cite the
Falcon footnote for the proposition that "disparate treatment cases challenging subjective decisionmaking processes could be certified as class actions." Caridad v. Metro North Commuter R.R., 191
F.3d 283, 292 (2d Cir. 1999), overruledby In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d.
Cir. 2006). See also Hnot v. Willis Grp. Holdings Ltd., 228 F.R.D. 476, 482 (S.D. N.Y. 2005)
(citing Caridad with approval for the proposition that challenges to subjective practices may be
certified "even when it is likely to be extremely difficult to prove that a grant of discretionary
authority has actually resulted in discriminatory practices.").
74. See, e.g., Bacon v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 375 F.3d 565, 571 (6th Cir. 2004)
(citing Falcon for the proposition that "conclusory allegations and general assertions of
discrimination are not sufficient to establish commonality."); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277) (emphasizing "wide gap"
language).
75. See Klein, supranote 47, at 146.
76. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
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In the context of cases challenging subjective employment
practices, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must "identifty] a
common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire
company[.] ' 77 In other words, plaintiff must provide evidence that each
class member was similarly affected by the subjective practice.
The plaintiffs in Wal-Mart were unable to meet this standard.
Although plaintiffs' statistics were highly statistically significant, they
could not support uniformity across the class. Their statistics were
aggregated at the regional level and not the store level - the locus of the
subjective decision-making.78 The Supreme Court also found plaintiffs'
anecdotal evidence insufficient to establish uniformity. Dukes proffered
114 declarations describing discriminatory treatment, which represented
only 1 declaration per 12,500 class members. 79 Half of these originated
from 6 states.8 0 The Court deemed plaintiffs' declarations neither
sufficiently numerous nor sufficiently representative to establish "a
common mode of exercising discretion."'8
The Supreme Court was equally dismissive of plaintiffs' expert
testimony. Under plaintiffs' theory of the case, statistical disparities
resulted from gender stereotyping imbued in Wal-Mart's corporate
culture.82 The Supreme Court, however, faulted plaintiffs' expert for
failing to quantify the portion of the observed disparities were
attributable Wal-Mart's corporate culture: "Whether 0.5 percent of 95
percent of the employment decisions at Wal-Mart might be determined
by stereotyped thinking is the essential question on which respondents'
theory of commonality depends. If Bielby admittedly has no answer to
that question, we can safely disregard what he has to say.",8 3 Scalia's
outright rejection of Bielby's testimony represents a significant setback
for cases similar to Wal-Mart, henceforth unable to rely on social
framework expert testimony8 4 to stitch together otherwise heterogeneous
class members for purposes of commonality.
The Supreme Court's approach to commonality in Wal-Mart is

77.

Id. at 2554-55.

78. Id. at 2555.
79. Id.at 2556. This figure compared unfavorably to other Supreme Court cases - the
plaintiff in Teamsters proffered one declaration for every eight class members, which were spread
throughout the region covered by the class.
80. Id.at 2556.
at 2554-55.
81. See id.
82. Id.at 2549.
83. Id. at 2554 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. See generally Monahan et. al, supra note 36 for a discussion of social framework
testimony.
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arguably more demanding than even stringent appellate interpretations
of Falcon, under which commonality could be established through
substantial evidence of an "entirely subjective" decision-making process.
Under Wal-Mart, such evidence no longer suffices - the plaintiff would
also need to show that the discriminatory component of the subjective
decision-making manifested itself uniformly throughout the class.
2. Delegated Discretion Does Not Qualify as a "Specific Employment
Practice" for Purposes of a Disparate Impact Claim
Disparate impact claims allege that an employer's facially neutral
85
practices had a disproportionately adverse impact on a protected group.
While disparate impact has long been a straightforward method for
challenging objective employer selection methods - such as tests of
physical strength, criminal background checks, and written tests 86 - the
Supreme Court first recognized challenges to subjective employment
87
practices in the 1988 decision, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust.
Although the Supreme Court in Watson expressed reservations
about making subjective practices subject to challenge, it was concerned
that failing to do so would "nullify" disparate impact jurisprudence by
allowing "employers [to] easily ...insulate themselves from liability"
through the adoption of subjective practices. 88 The Court reasoned that
disparate treatment claims alone could not remedy "the problem of
subconscious stereotypes[.] ...If an employer's undisciplined system of
subjective decision-making has precisely the same effects as a system
pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination, it is difficult to
see why Title VII's proscription against discriminatory actions should
not apply."'8 9
Watson imposed an additional burden on plaintiffs seeking to
challenge subjective practices - they must "identifly] the specific
employment practice that is challenged". 90 While identifying a specific

85. The Supreme Court first recognized disparate impact claims in the 1971 case of Griggs v.
Dukes Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Title VI1prohibited not only employment actions based on
discriminatory animus, reasoned the Court, it also mandated "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment." 401 U.S. at 431. Consequently, "[t]he Act proscribes ...
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation" unless they can be shown to be
related to job performance and fulfill a genuine business need. Id. at 431-32.
86. See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 45, at 1492-93.
87. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
88. Watson, 487 U.S. at 989-90.
89. Id.at 990-91.
90. Id.at 994.
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practice is "relatively easy to do in challenges to standardized tests,"
doing so in the context of subjective criteria "may sometimes be more
subjective criteria used in
difficult[,]" particularly when disentangling
91
ones.
objective
more
with
combination
In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court waded into the substance of
disparate impact claims by briefly touching upon the question of what
qualifies as a "specific employment practice." Citing Watson, and
without elaborating further, the Supreme Court stated that plaintiffs had
failed to identify a "specific employment practice" because "the bare
existence of delegated discretion" did not qualify. 92

Although the

Supreme Court offered no illustrations of subjective practices that would
qualify, it seemed to demand a subjective practice "whose nature and
effects" are uniform across the class. 93
3. Delegated Discretion is Insufficient to Establish Commonality in
Pattern or Practice Claims
The Supreme Court also altered the course of Title VII
jurisprudence as it relates to "pattern or practice" discrimination claims.
A "pattern or practice" claim is not a standalone cause of action but a
method through which a class of employees can prove disparate
treatment under Title VII using statistics 94 and anecdotal evidence. 95

As articulated by the Supreme Court in Teamsters, the "pattern or
practice" plaintiff must "establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that racial discrimination was the company's standard operating

91. Id.
92. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2555 (2011).
93. See id at 2555.
94. The Plaintiff generally must present statistical evidence that is both statistically and
practically significant. Statistical significance refers to a small likelihood that the disparities
occurred by chance. The generally accepted measure of statistical significance is a 5% likelihood
that the results occurred by chance. See Wright v. Stem, 450 F. Supp. 2d 335, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
However, courts will sometimes accept statistics based on a rule of thumb known as the "4/5ths
rule," comparing whether the selection rate for class members and non-class members are within
80% of each other. Howe v. City of Akron, 789 F. Supp. 2d 786, 797 (N.D. Ohio 2010). Practical
significance refers to whether the statistical differences are meaningful in the real world. For
example, in Apsley v. Boeing, the Court rejected a pattern or practice claim where workers over 40
were selected at a lower rate than those under 40. 722 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Kan. 2010). Although
the differences were highly statistically significant, the Court did not consider them to be
meaningful because the disparity only amounted to about 48 people out of more than 8,000 hires.
Id.at 1239.
95. See Wright, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 365-66. See also Apsley, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 1237, 1240-
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procedure - the regular rather than the unusual practice. 96 The plaintiff
need not show that the employer discriminated against each member of
the class, but it must establish that a discriminatory policy or regular
practice exists.97 The "[m]ere occurrence of
isolated or 'accidental' or
98
sporadic discriminatory acts" is insufficient.
In its discussion of Falcon, the Wal-Mart decision narrowed the
types of employer practices that would qualify as a "pattern or practice"
for purposes of commonality. Specifically, Wal-Mart requires either (1)
a test that produces a common result; 99 or (2) evidence of a general
policy of discrimination.100 Under this framework, subjective criteria do
not qualify as a "test" - "[t]he first manner of bridging the gap obviously
has no application here; Wal-Mart has no testing procedure or other
' The
companywide evaluation method that can be charged with bias." 10
Supreme Court also concluded, however, that a policy of decentralized
decision-making does not qualify as a "general policy of decisionmaking". Rather, a policy of decentralization "is just the opposite of a
uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality
needed for a class action;
it is a policy against having uniform
01 2
practices."'
employment
Although the standard articulated in Wal-Mart was nominally an
interpretation of Falcon, it is considerably more demanding than the
plain language of the Falcon footnote. 10 3 Falcon characterized an
"entirely subjective decision-making process" as an example of a
"general policy of discrimination".10 4 Under Falcon, the term "policy"
encompassed the employer's actual practices - "it is noteworthy that
Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices, not an abstract
policy of discrimination.' 1 5 Not so under Wal-Mart, where the term
"policy" would appear to refer to the employer's formalized policy,
whether implemented or not. The Court found that a general policy of
discrimination was "entirely absent" since "Wal-Mart's announced

96. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
97. See id at 360.
98. Id. at 336.
99. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011).
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2554.
103. Tristin Green argues that the Supreme Court's requirement that an overt policy of
discrimination be present to establish a "general policy of discrimination" represents a significant
and troubling shift in the applicable substantive law. Green, supra note 19, at 409-10.
104. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 146, n.15 (1982).
105. Id.
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'' 6
policy forbids sex discrimination.
To the extent that plaintiffs commonly base their disparate impact
and pattern or practice claims on a decentralized policy of subjective
decision-making alone, Wal-Mart could represent a significant shift.
The likely import and impact of Wal-Mart will depend, however, on
both the case law that preceded it, the overall prevalence of such claims,
and the availability of distinguishing facts. 107
In Sections IV and V below, I attempt to assess the likely impact of
Wal-Mart's heightened certification requirements by examining
disparate impact and pattern or practice claims from 2005 to mid-2011.
I examine the likely effect of Wal-Mart along multiple metrics: (1) the
prevalence of cases challenging subjective practices, (2) the success
rates for such cases and the reasons for their success or failure, and (3)
the presence of distinguishing facts that might have allowed cases to
meet the more stringent certification standard articulated in Wal-Mart. I
also examine the frequency with which the Wal-Mart district and
appellate court decisions were cited by other district and appellate
courts.

IV. METHODOLOGY

My research sample was constructed from a search on Westlaw and
Google Scholar of all federal court decisions since 2005 for cases with
the terms "employment" and "subjective" along with the phrases
"disparate impact" and/or "pattern or practice."
My sample included both published and unpublished opinions at
the appellate and district court level. This empirical methodology has
been used by other commentators studying disparate impact litigation.' 0 8
As Ian Ayres observed, a more complete data set would have involved
reviewing all cases filed, and not just those that produced a written
opinion. 1°9 Such research is extremely costly, however, because it

106. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553.
107. If claims similar to Wal-Mart have always been rare, a change in the case law would not
likely alter employer decision-making. Similarly, if district courts were already applying standards
similarly stringent to Wal-Mart prior to the Supreme Court ruling, Wal-Mart would have little
impact on a plaintiffs prospects. Likewise, if a large number of cases challenging subjective
practices are dismissed prior to class certification or if they are denied class certification for reasons
independent of commonality, then Wal-Mart's impact would be similarly limited.
108. See, e.g., Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 45, at 1494-97; Selmi, supra note 20, at 701,
734. See also Hall & Wright, supra note 53.
109. See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 45, at n.27. Research by the American Bar
Foundation found that approximately 15,000 employment discrimination lawsuits were filed in
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would have required reviewing the complaints of all filed employment
cases. 110

As Ayres observed, the use of an incomplete data set is only a
concern if there is an appreciable difference between federal cases
involving a written opinion and those that don't.'' Cases devoid of any
written opinions - published or unpublished - tend to be meritless or
low value cases that are dropped or settled prior to significant motion
practice, or where the facts or the law are so one-sided that the judge
need not engage in extensive analysis or justify his or her ruling for the
record.112 By contrast, large complex class actions with close questions
of law and fact are more likely to be heavily litigated, subject to
extensive motion practice, and the motions are more likely to require
analysis in the form of a written opinion.1" 3 Where there are heavily
contested issues of law and fact, a judge may also be more likely to draft
a written opinion to create a record in the event of an appeal.
The cases of interest for the purposes of this article fall within the
latter category. A meritless case devoid of factual or legal support
would not likely be influenced one way or the other by the Supreme
Court's opinion in Wal-Mart. To the contrary, and as discussed below
in Section V, the cases most likely to be influenced by Wal-Mart are
heavily contested class actions lasting several years and often generating
multiple written opinions. Indeed, written opinions would seem to be
particularly prevalent in cases challenging subjective practices on a class
wide basis in light of conflicting authority as to class certification
standards.
As Melissa Hart observed, class certification motions have a
dispositive quality 14 that lead employers to vigorously contest
2006, of which 4% of which alleged disparate impact. If we assume that filings from 2005 to mid2011 were constant, the American Bar Foundation's figures suggest that approximately 3,300
disparate impact claims were filed during that time. My review represents approximately 7% of all
disparate impact cases.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 1496.
112.
See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue Ill, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A
Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC'Y
REv. 1133, 1145-47 (1990) (observing that cases that do not result in a judicial opinion would be
disposed through means other than a judicial decision, such as settlement or voluntary dismissal, or
could be decided orally rather than through a written decision). See also Selmi, supra note 20, at
736 n. 144 (reviewing literature on empirical research based upon published decisions).
113.
See Selmi supra note 20, at 737 (noting that class actions are more likely to be litigated
and appealed); Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 112, at 1145-47 (finding that complex cases are
more likely to result in written opinions and that class actions are more likely to result in written

opinions).
114.

See Hart & Secunda, supra note 16, at 39.
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certification and submit extensive briefing on that point. My review of
cases suggests that employers attempt to preclude or limit class-related
liability not only through oppositions through certification, but also in
motions to dismiss, motions to strike class allegations, motions to limit
the scope of class wide discovery, motions for summary judgment,
decertification motions, and appeals of certification decisions. To the
extent that the presiding judge issued a published or unpublished opinion
on any such motion between 2005 and 2011, it would have been
included in my sample. Where the subject of the motion was not
dispositive as to the merits or to certification, I conducted follow up
research on PACER, reviewing the docket sheet and electronic filings to
locate any dispositive or class-related rulings and determine the outcome
of the case.
The sample size generated by my search terms is comparable to
past studies of disparate impact cases. My search for cases challenging
subjective employment practices yielded 718 results on Westlaw, 184 of
which alleged disparate impact, 65 alleged a pattern or practice disparate
treatment, and 48 alleged both claims,'1 5 for a total of 297 analyzed
cases. Michael Selmi examined 6 years worth of published and
unpublished disparate impact cases from a period spanning 1983-2002,
which produced a total of 301 analyzed cases. 1 6 Since Selmi was
examining all disparate impact cases, as opposed to only those
containing the word "subjective," one would expect his sample to be
larger than mine. Ian Ayres analyzed 13 years worth of published
disparate impact cases spanning 1971 to 1995, which yielded 294
analyzed cases. 17 One would expect Ayres' sample size to be
somewhat smaller than Selmi's, since it contained only published
opinions.
V. RESULTS

The results below first examine the prevalence of claims
challenging subjective employment practices, and their accompanying
success rates. This analysis includes cases brought by individuals, the

115. I included only Title VII and ADEA disparate impact and pattern or practice claims in
my review. I excluded from my analysis cases challenging a pattern or practice of harassment, as
they are subject to an idiosyncratic standard for class certification. I also excluded claims asserted
under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act because of the
substantive differences involved in proving such claims.
116. Selmi, supra note 20, at 735.
117. See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 45, at 1494-95.
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EEOC, multiple plaintiffs, and putative class actions. I then examine the

class action claims in greater detail, first with a discussion of cases for
which class certification was denied or that were otherwise dismissed,
and comparing the reasoning in those decisions to the Supreme Court's
decision in Wal-Mart. Lastly, I examine cases where class certification
was granted, and discuss the extent to which they could survive the more
exacting commonality requirements set forth in Wal-Mart.
A. Prevalence of Claims ChallengingSubjective Practices

1. Cases Dismissed with Little or No Discussion
Of the 297 analyzed cases, 98 were dismissed by the court with
little or no discussion of the basis for the claim. The discussion of these
claims was so cursory that I could not determine whether the plaintiff
practice or a more
sought to challenge a subjective employment
8
objective practice, such as a written test."
Disparate impact claims were most commonly dismissed for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies and a failure to allege or proffer any
evidence at all in support of the claim. For example, disparate impact
plaintiffs sometimes failed to proffer any statistics in support of their
claim, or the inadequate statistics they presented would fail to compare
disparities in selection rates. 119 Some of the disparate impact claims
appeared to consist of 'kitchen sink' claims, added thoughtlessly to an
overinclusive complaint, and voluntarily withdrawn by the plaintiff
when it became clear that the claim lacked merit.
Pattern or practice claims were most commonly dismissed because
they were brought by individuals or multiple plaintiffs rather than as
class actions. Although courts sometimes permit a plaintiff to proffer
statistics or other pattern or practice evidence in support of their pretext
argument, none of the cases I reviewed permitted an individual plaintiff
to rely exclusively on a pattern or practice to prove their individual
claims.
118. Although all of these cases included the word "subjective," the term showed up in
unrelated contexts, such as the standard for proving a harassment claim, or the principle that an
employee's subjective belief that his or her performance was adequate is insufficient to prove
pretext.
119. Disparate impact claims typically require a comparison between the number of applicants
in each group to the number actually selected. Only where there is a large difference between
selection rates are the statistics considered meaningful. Inadequate statistics, for example, would
allege that older workers were terminated at a high rate in a reduction in force, but would not offer
the selection rate for younger workers for comparison.
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2. Cases Challenging Subjective Practices
Of the 297 analyzed cases, I identified 106 that challenged
subjective employment practices, representing about sixteen cases per
year.1 20 Subject to the methodological problems described above - that
my sample includes only cases involving written opinions, and that the
written opinions had to be sufficiently detailed to identify the challenged
practice as subjective - this represents a strikingly small number.
Chart 1 below summarizes the success rates of subjective cases
based on the number of plaintiffs involved. I defined "win" very
broadly, to include the granting of a class certification motion, in whole
121
or in part. Surviving summary judgment was also counted as a "win."
A loss on appeal or the granting of a decertification motion, however,
was counted as a loss. 122 I defined "ongoing" narrowly, to include those
cases where the issue of certification continues to be litigated. 123

120. The remaining ninety-three analyzed cases consisted of disparate impact or pattern
practice claims challenging objective employment practices or tests.
121. In one case, this resulted in treating a case as a "win" after surviving summary judgment
even though the plaintiff subsequently lost in a bench trial.
122. One of the cases I counted as a loss, Boatwright v. Walgreen Co., No. 1:10-cv-03902,
Mar. 4, 2011), consisted of the court's decision to dismiss class
2011 WL 843898 (N.D. I11.
allegations on its own motion in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 474
F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007).
123. Cases with an open docket, but where the court had already ruled on certification or
summary judgment were excluded from the "ongoing" category and were counted as either a win or
a loss.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2012

23

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5

[Vol. 29:2

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

Chart 1 - Cases ChallengingSubjective PracticesBy Plaintiff Type
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As summarized in Chart 1, class actions represent nearly half (49 out of
106) of the disparate impact and pattern or practice cases. Class actions
are ordinarily quite rare - representing 3% of employment
discrimination cases. 124 Their prevalence among disparate impact and
pattern or practice claims is to be expected for the reasons previously
discussed: pattern or practice claims can only be asserted as a class, and
disparate impact claims demand considerable aggregate statistical
evidence. Individual claims are almost as common as class action
claims (42 out of 106), but far less successful. Claims asserted by
multiple individuals or in a collective action ("multiple plaintiffs") are
uncommon (11 out of 106) but fare reasonably well.

124.

See Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, Ryon Lancaster & Nicholas Pedriana,

Contesting Workplace Discrimination in Court: Characteristics and Outcomes of Federal
Employment Discrimination Litigation 1987-2003, AM. BAR FOUND. 13 (Oct. 29, 2008),

http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documentsNielsen-abf
df.
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125
My sample produced only four lawsuits brought by the EEOC.
By contrast, the EEOC brought or intervened in 1,461 Title VII lawsuits
between 2005 and 2010.126 The scarcity of EEOC claims challenging
subjective practices suggests that such practices are not considered a
priority by the Commission. Notably, the EEOC is not bound by Rule
23's class certification in bringing litigation on behalf of groups of
employees. 127 The Commission therefore may come under increasing
pressure to pursue claims involving subjective practices post-WalMart.128
Chart 1 overestimates success rates because it does not include the
ninety-eight claims dismissed in cursory fashion without discussion of
the practices being challenged. 129 Because the dismissed claims lacked
sufficient information to determine whether they challenged subjective

practices, the inclusion of such data does not generate a precise success
30
rate. It can, however, be used to generate a range for success rates.1
Using this methodology, class actions had a success rate of 27-29%,
individual claims had a success rate of 2-5%, and claims brought as a
collective action or by multiple plaintiffs had a success rate of
33- 73%.13 1 The success rate for EEOC claims was unchanged at 50%.
The success rate, combining claims by all plaintiff types, was

125. Indeed, my search terms generated more EEOC claims challenging a pattern or practice
of harassment than those challenging subjective employment practices, which is somewhat
surprising given that pattern or practice harassment claims are even more difficult to certify than
discrimination claims.
126. EEOC Litigation Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2010, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last
visited Apr. 22, 2012).
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(6)(a) (2006).
128. According to a recent report by Seyfarth Shaw LLP, "the EEOC's prosecution of pattern
or practice lawsuits is now an agency-wide priority. Many of the high-level investigations started in
2006 mushroomed into the institution of EEOC pattern or practice lawsuits in 2010 and 2011 False
The Commission's 2011 Annual Report also announced that it expects to continue the dramatic shift
in the composition of its litigation docket from small individual cases to pattern or practice lawsuits
on behalf of larger groups of workers." ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION REPORT:
2012),
LLP
(Jan.
SHAW
EDITION,
SEYFARTH
2012

http://www.seyfarth.com/dir docs/publications/2012%20car/2Oshort%20final%20(secured).pdf.
129. The effect is particularly pronounced as to individual claims - seventy-one of the ninetyeight dismissed claims were brought by individuals. The omission also has a substantial effect on
the success rate of claims brought by multiple plaintiffs - thirteen of these were dismissed. The
inclusion of the dismissed cases would have only a limited effect on the results as to the class action
claims, however, since only three of these were dismissed without discussion. No claims brought
by the EEOC were dismissed without discussion.
130. The bottom of the range assumes all of the dismissed claims challenged subjective
practices, and the top of the range assumes none of them did.
131. I treated "ongoing" cases as a loss.
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between 13% and 25%, which is lower than the average success rate for
federal employment discrimination cases of 3 5 %. 132 It is, however,
comparable to the success rate obtained by Michael Selmi in his review
of all disparate impact opinions. Selmi's success rate ranged from
11.5% to 20.8% for his sample taken between 1996 and 2002.13' This
suggests that plaintiffs were about as successful at challenging
subjective practices under a disparate impact and/or a pattern or practice
theory as the average disparate impact case.
Chart 2, below, summarizes the success rate for cases challenging
subjective practices based on the type of adverse employer action at
issue. 114 Twenty one (21) of the cases challenged more than one adverse
35
action, almost all of which consisted of compensation and promotion
claims. These cases appear multiple times on Chart 2.

132. Selmi, supra note 20, at 739. Selmi defined success as surviving a motion for summary
judgment or a motion to dismiss. Id. at 735.
133. Id. at 739.
134. Chart 2 does not contain the ninety-eight cases dismissed in a cursory fashion, as most
contained insufficient information to identify the adverse employment action at issue.
135. I defined "promotion" to include challenges to employer assignments.
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Chart 2 - Cases ChallengingSubjective PracticesBy Type of Claim
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The majority of cases (64 out of 106) challenge compensation or
promotion practices. Failure to hire and termination 136 claims are less
than half as common. Compensation and promotion claims have a
higher success rate than termination and failure to hire claims.
Termination-related claims are notably scarce, with only 28 cases
brought over the 6 year period covered in my sample. This result is
surprising, given that termination-related claims are otherwise quite
common. A study conducted by the American Bar Foundation found
that 60% of the federal discrimination claims filed in a random sample
drawn from 1983-2003 challenged a termination.137 With approximately
15,000 discrimination claims filed in federal court annually, 38 one
would have expected more than a handful of termination-related
disparate impact claims.
136.

I defined "termination" to include reductions in force, as well as employee discipline.

137.
138.

See NIELSON ET AL., supra note 124, at 45.
Nathan Koppel, Job-Discrimination Cases Tend to Fare Poorly in Federal Court,

WSJ.cOM (Feb. 19,2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123500883048618747.html.
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The predominance of promotion and compensation claims, often
asserted together, is also uncharacteristic of employment discrimination
claims generally. Promotion and pay-related claims represent only 19%
and 14%, respectively, of all employment discrimination claims from
1983-2003.139 The prevalence of pay and promotion claims in my
sample may be partly attributable to the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,
passed in 2009, which enables plaintiffs to more easily recover140back pay
when a wage disparity occurs over the course of several years.
Pay and promotion claims may also be attractive to plaintiffs'
attorneys because the damages can be quite high and are readily
calculated using statistical models and comparisons which can readily be
made to other current employees outside of the protected class. Because
pay and promotion decisions affect almost every employee, the class can
potentially encompass a large number of current and former employees,
also increasing the settlement value of the lawsuit. Pay and promotion
claims are also highly disruptive to employers because they often
implicate current employees, rather than employees who were never
hired or employees who have already been terminated. The disruption
may cause the employer to pay a higher premium to settle the case.
Lastly, the prevalence of pay and promotion claims over hiring and
termination claims may reflect information asymmetries. An employee
who stays with a company long enough will likely discover the
employer's pay and promotion criteria through discussions with coworkers, supervisors, and human resources. By contrast, an employee
who is not hired or who is terminated through a reduction in force may
never learn how the employer made its decision, making it difficult for
the plaintiff to identify a "specific employment practice" for purposes of
asserting a disparate impact claim.
The small absolute number of "failure to hire" claims in my sample
is perhaps less surprising. Failure to hire claims represent only nine
percent of all discrimination claims nationally.' 4 ' Hiring cases have
been on the decline since the 1970s, as documented by Charles Donohue
and Peter Siegelman in 1991.142 Ian Ayres documented a decline in
hiring claims as a proportion of all disparate impact claims, with hiring
cases representing about fifteen percent and firing cases representing

139. NIELSON ET AL., supra note 124, at 6.
140. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, H.R. 11, 111 th Cong. §§ 2(1), 3 (2009) (enacted).
141. NIELSON ET AL., supra note 124, at 45.
142. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
DiscriminationLitigation, STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991).
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twenty-five percent of all disparate impact claims. 43 Hiring cases are
also difficult to prove, because they can require the plaintiff to proffer
statistics about the qualified applicant pool in the relevant labor
market. 144 By contrast, statistics for promotion, pay and termination
related cases are based on incumbent employee information, which can
be obtained from the employer through discovery.
Setting aside the comparative frequency of claims challenging
subjective practices, their overall prevalence is quite low. Even when
combining the 106 subjective cases with the ninety-eight cases
dismissed with little or no discussion, the sample consists of only thirtyone cases per year. This represents a miniscule number of cases
when
45
compared to the ubiquity of subjective employment practices. 1
Indeed, legal scholars have theorized that subjective hiring
practices have grown more prevalent over time. When Elizabeth
Bartholet argued in a 1982 article that courts should subject subjective
hiring practices to greater scrutiny, subjective employment practices
were considered the domain of "jobs in high places."' 146 However, Ian
Ayres theorized that the development of case law in the 1970s
challenging objective employment practices under a disparate impact
theory encouraged employers to "abando[n] testing and other objective
practices in favor of subjective hiring47standards that are less likely to
give rise to disparate impact liability.'
The Supreme Court's 1988 Watson decision recognizing subjective
disparate impact claims 148 has apparently done little to alter the
popularity of subjective practices. Tristin Green argued that "companies
have been flattening hierarchies and pushing management and decision

143. Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 45, at 1494-95.
144. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977).
145. A 1965 study of 852 organizations found that ninety-nine percent of employers used
interviews, a highly subjective method, to select candidates. Michael A. McDaniel, Deborah L.

Whetzel, Frank L. Scmidt & Steven Maurer, The Validity of Employment Interviews: A
Comprehensive Review and Meta-Analysis, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 599, 599 (1994) (citing Lynn
Ulright & Don Trumbo, The Selection Interview Since 1949, 63 PSYCHOL. BULL. 100, 100 (1965)).
A follow up study in 1982 found that ninety-one percent of employers required at least two
interviews before hiring a candidate, despite extensive research indicating that it is not a reliable
predictor of job performance. Timothy A. Judge & Gerald R. Ferris, The Elusive Criterion ofFit in
Employment Interview Decisions 3 (Ctr. For Advanced Human Res. Studies, Working Paper No.
91-26, 1991) (citing ROBERT L. DIPBOYE & WILLIAM CARL HOWELL, ESSENTIALS OF INDUSTRIAL
AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (1982)).

146.
REV. 945,
147.
148.

See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Johs in High Places, 95 HARV. L.
995-96, 998 (1982).
Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 45, at 1491-92.
See generally Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
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making authority lower" since the 1980s. 149 As a result, "evaluation of
work performance is becoming more decentralized, subjective and
contextual... more amorphous, both less easily measured in objective
terms and more dependent on social interaction and firsthand
observation. 15 ° Wal-Mart would seem to be an example of this trend,
where even the lowliest of first line managers were empowered to make
both compensation and promotion decisions with no guidance from
headquarters as to the basis upon which to make such decisions.' 5'
Where subjective practices are ubiquitous and only thirty-one cases
challenging such practices result in a written opinion each year, the odds
of facing such litigation is the employment equivalent of being struck by
lightning.'
The infrequency of these claims suggests that employers
have, or perhaps should have, ignored litigation risks associated with
disparate impact claims even while the district court's plaintiff-favorable
ruling in Wal-Mart remained good law.
Of course, it is possible that employers overestimated their
litigation risk or acted conservatively as a result of the heavy publicity
afforded to the Wal-Mart case as it worked its way up to the Supreme
Court.5 3

And as discussed in greater detail below, the risk of a very

large disparate impact or pattern or practice class action is not
homogenous across all employers - the 100 largest Fortune 500
companies faced a substantial risk of being sued for subjective practices
between 2005 and 2011.
Nevertheless, for the vast majority of
employers, Wal-Mart will have no effect on their personnel practices,
since their baseline litigation risk is de minimus.
149. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a StructuralAccount
of DisparateTreatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 101 (2003).

150. Id. at 103.
151. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
152. An employer's annual risk of being sued is somewhat more probable than being struck by
lightning. The National Weather Service reports that an individual's odds of being struck by
lightning in any given year is one in 775,000. Mary Ann Cooper, Medical Aspects of Lightning,
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE, http://www.lightningsafety.noaa.gov/medical.htm (last visited Mar.
24, 2012). Based on the Census Bureau's report of 6,049,655 employers in the United States, an
employer's annual risk of disparate impact/pattem or practice litigation based on subjective
practices is approximately one in 195,000. See Statistics About Business Size (Including Small
Business) from the U.S. Census Bureau, Table 2b. Employment Size of Employer and Nonemployer

Firms, 2007, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/econlsmallbus.html#EmpSize (last
updated Mar. 21, 2012).
153. Indeed, personnel managers and defense attorneys may overestimate or overemphasize
disparate impact litigation risks in seeking to persuade employers to improve their personnel
practices. See Selmi, supra note 45 at 766; Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace:
Symbol and Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959,

984 (1999).
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In subsections B and C below, I examine class actions challenging
subjective practices in depth to better understand how the Supreme
Court's ruling in Dukes might affect that subset of cases.
B. Characteristicsof Losing Class Actions.
Chart 3 depicts the prevalence and success rates of class action
challenging subjective employment practices.
Chart3 - Composition of Class Action Claims ChallengingSubjective
Practices
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Challenges to pay and/or promotion practices represent the large
majority of class actions asserted (thirty-seven out of forty-nine),
followed by nine lawsuits challenging hiring and only four challenging
termination. The success rate for pay/promotion, and hiring claims was
equivalent at 32-33%. Because pay/promotion claims were much more
common than hiring cases, they also represented almost all of the
successful class action claims, comprising twelve out of fourteen of
successful claims. None of the termination related claims achieved class
certification or withstood summary judgment. 154
154.

However, plaintiffs appear to be challenging termination-related practices more
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Of the losing cases, a substantial number denied class certification
for the same reasons as articulated in Wal-Mart.'5 5 For example, in
McReynolds v. Merill Lynch, the court denied class certification to a
nationwide class of African American financial advisors on the basis of
commonality.1 56 The court opined, "decentralized procedures, that allow
decision-makers across the country to consider subjective factors makes
it far more difficult to establish that the employer engages in a pattern or
practice of discrimination as a standard operating procedure, and thus
more difficult to establish commonality."' 57 Another district court held
that, in the absence of a general discriminatory policy, certification
requires the plaintiff to show that "bias emanating from the upperechelons of corporate management... infected the [subjective decisions
of] managers and supervisors below" or that a "corporate culture of...
bias... resulted in a widespread pattern of' discriminatory decisionmaking. 158
Similarly, in Puffer v. Allstate, the court denied certification to a
class of female employees challenging "excessively subjective"
compensation and promotion practices.159 Like the Supreme Court in
Wal-Mart, the district court interpreted Falcon to require that "the
alleged policy manifested itself in the 'same general fashion' as to all
putative class members" and that the subjective policies were "uniformly
used as a mask for discrimination" or "to evade statutory anti-

successfully in the context of claims by multiple individuals or a collective action, where class
certification requirements need not be met. Four (4) out of the five (5) termination-related claims in
my sample that were brought by multiple individuals or through a collective action were successful
in doing so.
155. The remaining cases generally suffered from defects so severe that the Supreme Court's
decision in Wal-Mart would not have altered the result. Common defects included cases presenting
flawed statistics or typicality issues arising from the particular circumstances of the named plaintiff.
See, e.g., Rollins v. Alabama Comty. Coll. Sys., No. 2:09cv636-WHA, 2010 WL 4269133 (M.D.
Ala. Oct. 25, 2010); Boyd v. Interstate Brands Corp., 256 F.R.D. 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2009);
Attenborough v. Constr. and Gen. Bldg. Laborers' Local 79, 238 F.R.D. 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Carpenter v. Boeing, 456 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2006); Apsley v. Boeing, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D.
C. Kan. 2010); Moore v. Napolitano, 723 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. C. 2010); Anderson v. Westinghouse
Savannah River Co., 406 F. 3d 248 (4th Cir. 2005).
156. See Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order at 9, 12, McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch,
No. 05 C 6583 (N.D. 11. Aug. 5, 2010).
157. Id. at9.
158. Apsley, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 1240-1241. See also Port Auth. Police Asian Jade Soc'y of
New York & New Jersey, Inc. v. Port Auth. Of New York and New Jersey, 681 F. Supp. 2d 456,
464 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that "intentional discrimination was so pervasive in the Port
Authority's [subjective] practices for promotion to sergeant that it amounted to a discriminatory
policy or custom.")
159. See Puffer v. Allstate Ins., 255 F.R.D. 450, 459 (N.D. I1.2009).
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discrimination rules.'

60

Several other cases denied class certification on

the basis of commonality using similar reasoning.'
Like Wal-Mart, several courts also denied class certification to
disparate impact claims on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to
identify the subjective employment practice with sufficient specificity.'

That several courts reached denied certification on the same basis
as the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart, suggests that Wal-Mart was not a

radical departure from existing jurisprudence. This finding is consistent
with Melissa Hart's conclusion in 2006 that "a majority of courts to
consider similar class action claims have concluded that ... the central
decision to delegate authority does not transform the individual
decisions into a single, uniform policy."163
C. Characteristicsof Winning Class Actions.
Chart 4, below, illustrates the winning class action cases included in
my sample, along with the four ongoing cases with certification disputes

160. Id. at460.
161. Yapp v. Union Pac., 229 F.R.D. 608 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (denied class certification to class
of African American applicants on the basis of commonality where decision-making was
decentralized to twenty different departments); Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, 467 F. Supp. 2d
403, 412 (D.N.J. 2006) (denying class certification on the basis of commonality and noting that the
class was broader in scope than Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007); Rollins v.
Alabama Cmty. Coll. Sys., No. 2:09cv636-WHA, 2010 WL 4269133 at *6 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (class
certification denied on the basis of commonality where class involved decisions made by different
individuals at geographically dispersed locations); Armstrong v. Powell, 230 F.R.D. 661 (W.D. Ok.
2005) (denying class certification on the basis of commonality, holding that "[a]bsent centralized
decision-making or some other identifiable common 'practice' of discrimination, any acts of
discrimination suffered by the Plaintiffs through their non-selection cannot be construed as
company-wide.").
162. See Gutierrez, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 409 (employer's "policy of delegating discretion to
operating companies ...result[ing] in excessively subjective employment practices" insufficiently
specific to support class certification); O'Neal v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., No. 3:03-CV-397, 2006
WL 1469348 (E.D. Tenn. May 25, 2006) (holding mere allegation of "excessive subjectivity"
without "demonstrating that any practice or policy, which, though demonstrably neutral... ha[d] a
disproportionate adverse impact upon African Americans" insufficient to satisfy commonality);
Yapp v. Union Pacific, 299 F.R.D. 608, 621-22 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (holding that there is no
commonality where plaintiff failed to identify subjective aspect of decision-making responsible for
the disparity, noting that "[e]specially in cases where an employer combines subjective criteria with
the use of more rigid standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is in our view responsible for isolating
and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed
statistical disparities."); Gaston v. Exelon Corp., 247 F.R.D. 75, 83 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (denying class
certification where plaintiffs "failed to identify a policy, practice, or procedure that is the root of the
alleged harm for all class members").
163. Hart, supra note 7, at 21.
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pending prior to the Wal-Mart decision.1 64 Chart 4 attempts to illustrate
the likelihood with which these cases might survive the Supreme Court's
more stringent standard set forth in Wal-Mart based on the presence or
absence of a number of distinguishing characteristics: (1) whether the
applicable court reached its decision without citing the district or
appellate court decision in Wal-Mart; (2) whether the geographic scope
of the class is limited to a single site or multiple sites within a single
city; (3) whether the decision-maker(s) responsible for the challenged
employment action consisted of a single individual or a handful of
individuals; and (4) whether the challenged subjective practice consisted
of disregarding objective criteria specified by centralized management.
Chart 4 also sets forth the applicable class size, if known, and the
outcome or current status of the case.

164. I excluded the case that successfully obtained class certification but lost on the merits
from Chart 5, since the unfavorable conclusion to the case would not have been affected by the
Supreme Court's ruling in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). The pending
status of cases was determined based on docket sheets and opinions available on PACER as of
January 2012.
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I Brown v. Nucor

Unknown

8 Tumley v. Bank of America
9 Velez v. Nomertis
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Schaefer v. General Electric
Satchell v. Fedex
Nelson v. Wal-Mart
Chen-Oster v. Goldman Sachs
Ellis v. Costco
Carlson v. CHRobinson
Bell v. Lockheed Martin
Holloway v. Best Buy

Single or small group of decision-makers
--

5,600
> 1,000

--

Thousands
3,501
'Thousands
700
1,925
17,000
390,000

Decision-maker disregarded objective criteria
Outcome
Settled for injunctive relief and $15,000.
Settled for injunctie relief and damages to be determined.
Settled for injunctie relief and $11.8 million in damages.
Post-certification discovery ongoing.
Court imposed injunctive relief and $3.2 million in back pay.
Settled for injunctive relief and $8.5 million in damages.
Motion
M
for decertification pending.
Settled for $7.2 million after motion to dismiss denied.
Settled for injunctive relief and $175 million after jury erdict.
Settled for undisclosed amount after suNing motion to dismiss.
Settled for injunctie relief, fees, and $54 million.
Settled for injunctive relief, fees, and $17.5 million.
Plaintiff has not yet brought a certification motion.
Remanded in light of Supreme Court's Wal-Mart decision.
Settled for injunctie relief, fees and $15million in damages.
Class certification denied givenSupreme Court's Wal-Mart decision.
Settled for injunctie relief and fees.

The presence of the above four types of distinguishing features,
particularly in combination, may render a case sufficiently distinct from
Wal-Mart that it would survive the more stringent standards articulated
by the Supreme Court. As discussed in greater detail below, these
features are consistent with some of the language and reasoning in the
Supreme Court's decision. They may also serve as distinguishing facts
for district courts otherwise inclined to grant certification. Wal-Mart
involved an extreme fact pattern - a sprawling class of 1.5 million
current and former female employees in all 3,400 Wal-Mart stores
nationwide.1 66 As they did with Falcon, district courts may ultimately
set aside the broad rhetoric in Wal-Mart and distinguish future cases on
the facts.

165. A darkened square represents the presence of the applicable distinguishing characteristic.
A light gray square refers to the partial presence of a distinguishing characteristic. The "ongoing"
cases are in bold.
166. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir. 2007).
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1. Absence of a Citation to Wal-Mart
The first factor - the absence of a citation to Wal-Mart - would not,
on its own, necessarily render the case distinguishable from Wal-Mart.
The case could have cited other plaintiff-friendly case law effectively
overruled by Wal-Mart. Somewhat surprisingly, only three of the
court ruling
thirteen successful class actions cited the district or appellate
67
1
decision.
certification
its
of
support
in
in Wal-Mart
2. Limited Geographic Scope of Class
A more localized geographic scope is more likely to satisfy the
Wal-Mart standard because it allows the plaintiff to avoid pursuing a
theory of decentralized decision-making, which the Supreme Court
characterized as "the opposite of a uniform employment practice that
would provide the commonality needed."'' 6 8 Particularly where the
geographic scope of the class is localized to the area in which the
decision-making takes place, the plaintiff need not make an attenuated
argument about how the culture at headquarters infected decisionmakers across a diffuse region. 169 The argument that a single site or
geographically proximate sites were infected by stereotypes, arising
through common personnel, interactions among sites, or an ongoing
history of discrimination, would not necessarily be inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's ruling. Likewise, anecdotal evidence from a limited
geographic area would be considered truly representative of the class - a
also deemed relevant in overturning the
fact the Supreme Court
70
decision.1
certification
A recent report by Seyfarth Shaw LLP predicts that the number of
employment discrimination class actions will increase as the plaintiff's
bar seeks to bring state-wide or regional claims in lieu of a nationwide

167. Three of the "ongoing" cases cited the district or appellate decisions in Wal-Mart in one
way or another. Two pre-certification cases cite the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart in their
briefing. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman Sacks, No. 6950, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12961 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 19, 2012); Bell v. Lockheed Martin, No. 08-6292, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143657 (D.N.J. Dec.
14, 2011). The final ongoing case in my sample, Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (9th
Cir. 2011), was appealed to the Ninth Circuit following the district court's granting of class
certification. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to consider whether, in light
of the Supreme Court's ruling in Wal-Mart, the named plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the
putative class. See Ellis, 657 F.3d 970 at 988.
168. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
169. Hart, supra note 7, at 19.
170. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2549.
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class action. 171 However, it is yet to be seen whether state-wide or
regional class actions may ultimately prove too ambitious
to succeed
172
within the framework set forth by the Supreme Court.
3. Small Number of Decision-makers
A class based upon a single decision-maker or a group of decisionmakers acting in a joint or coordinated fashion would more likely meet
Wal-Mart's commonality requirement because class members would be
affected similarly by the actions of those individuals. 173 It also renders
the anecdotal evidence more meaningful because a discriminatory
comment attributed to a decision-maker about one employee is probative
of how that employee treated others similarly situated.
The Supreme Court found the presence of thousands of decisionmakers in Wal-Mart particularly damaging to the plaintiffs' case for
commonality. 174 While some managers in a decentralized decisionmaking structure may intentionally discriminate or reward attributes that
produce a disparate impact, the Supreme Court claimed that "most
managers... would select sex-neutral, performance based criteria ...
that produce no actionable disparity at all.' 75 Class certification in the
face
of such
heterogeneous
decision-making
would
be
counterproductive, the court reasoned, because "it is quite unbelievable
that all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way
without some common direction."' 17 6 Commonality fails because
resolving an issue as to one manager
would not necessarily shed any
77
light on the behavior of another. 1
This aspect of the Supreme Court's decision may be the most
troubling for those seeking to challenge subjective decision-making,
since it effectively places an upper limit on the size of the class.
However, as Chart 4 illustrates, it is still possible to assemble a fairly
large class based on the actions of only a few decision-makers. Wright

171. See ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 128, at 9.
172. The plaintiffs in Dukes v. Wal-Mart subsequently scaled back the proposed class size to
California employees, with an estimated 45,000 class members. See id. at 3-4. Wal-Mart's motion
to dismiss this more circumscribed class is pending in the California district court.
173. See, e.g., Amended Memorandum Opinion And Order at 9, McReynolds v. Merrill
Lynch, No. 05 C 6583 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2010) (holding that commonality is "generally easily
satisfied when an individual or even a small centralized group makes decisions").
174. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
175. Id.
176. Id. at2555.
177. Id. at 2554.
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v. Stern178 involved a class of 3,500 challenging subjective employment
decisions where the head parks commissioner was involved in a large
proportion of the park's personnel decisions. 179 Similarly, Duling v.
Gristedes8 ° involved a class of more than 600 where a single personnel
manager was involved in the promotion and compensation decisions.181
Hnot v. Willis 182 presents an alternative model for challenging subjective
decisions post-Wal-Mart.
Hnot involved 106 female officers
challenging promotion and compensation decisions made by a small
handful of executives. 183 Indeed, five of the thirteen successful class
actions involved a single or a small handful of decision-makers.
4. Disregarding Objective Criteria
The last factor-a decision-maker's disregard for objective criteria
specified by centralized management-was present in four of the
successful class actions depicted in Chart 4. For example, in one case,
managers avoided the civil service exam prerequisite for promotions by
subjectively appointing employees "temporarily" in the desired position
on an effectively permanent basis. 184 The plaintiffs successfully
demonstrated that no women had been afforded the benefit of the
discretionary "temporary" appointments. 185 In another case, decisionmakers subjectively adjusted interview results intended to produce
objective scoring, which had a disparate impact on African American
employees. 186
In theory, challenging a subjective disregard for objective criteria
would be difficult under Falcon, since some courts interpreted it to
require that a practice be "entirely subjective" to be actionable. 187 When
faced with these cases, however, courts generally concluded that the
"entirely subjective" language was merely an example Falcon presented
of an actionable employer practice. 88 Courts instead cite Watson for the
proposition that a practice with both objective and subjective

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Wright v. Stem, 553 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id. at 338.
Duling v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 267 F.R.D. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Id. at 100.
Hnot v. Willis Group Holdings, Ltd., 228 F.R.D. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 485.
See Card v. City of Cleveland, 270 F.R.D. 280, 284 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
Id. at 288.
See Grant v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 727 F. Supp. 2d 677, 710 (M.D. Tenn. 2010).
See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982).
See, e.g., Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 955 (9th Cir. 2003).
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components could be challenged provided the plaintiff be sufficiently
89
precise as to which of the components he or she seeks to challenge.'
The Supreme Court in Wal-Mart arguably sided with Watson on
this point. Although it quoted an excerpt from Falcon containing the
"entirely subjective" language, it chose not to fixate on whether the
practice at issue was "entirely" subjective.' 9 Its focus instead was
whether the "discrimination manifested itself ...in the same general
fashion" common to the class.' 91
Although the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart offered no examples of
subjective practices manifested uniformly through the class, the
subjective alteration of objective criteria could satisfy this standard.
These fact patterns offer the objective criteria as a benchmark for
decision-making absent the subjective component.192 To the extent that
the injection of discretion produces a disparate impact, the impact can be
precisely attributed to the subjective component. Such precision fits the
Supreme Court's insistence, relying on Watson, that the plaintiff identify
a "specific employment practice" in a disparate impact claim beyond
"the bare existence of delegated discretion."'' 93 The decision to override
objective criteria is also compelling in a pattern or practice claim
because it injects a degree of animus into the plaintiffs story: the
decision-maker consciously chose not to follow an objective standard in
a way that rendered the outcome more discriminatory.
5. Prevalence of Distinguishing Facts Among Winning Class Actions
Overall, six of the thirteen successful class actions from 2005-2011
possessed two or more of the distinguishing fact patterns described
above. These cases are sufficiently distinct from the facts present in
Wal-Mart in that they arguably would have reached the same conclusion
had the Supreme Court's ruling been in place as of 2005. These cases
were smaller, on average, than those with similar fact patterns to WalMart, and commensurately resulted in a smaller recovery. They had an
189. See Watson v. Fort Worth, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
190. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2553 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at
159). The Supreme Court chose not to do so despite extensive briefing by Wal-Mart that its
practices were not "entirely" subjective. See Brief for Petitioner at 20, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277).
191.
Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2553 (quoting Falcon,457 U.S. at 159).
192. While the comparison of a subjective practice to an alternative objective practice without
a disparate impact could theoretically be made in any disparate impact case, the concrete nature of
an existing objective practice is especially compelling.
193. Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2555 (citing Watson, 487 U.S. at 994).
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average class size of around 1,000 and a median class size of 600. The
mean and median recovery was approximately $5.8 million. This
finding is consistent with a recent report by Seyfarth Shaw LLP,
showing that class action settlements of employment discrimination
94
claims were "decidedly smaller" in 2011 than in past years. 1
The remaining seven successful cases and three ongoing cases
would likely have been influenced by the Supreme Court's decision.
The average and median class size for these cases was 59,000 and 3,500,
respectively. 195 The mean and median recovery in these cases was $45
million and $16 million. 196
The largest of the class actions in the sample, Holloway v. Best
Buy, 197 settled four days before the Supreme Court's decision. 198 The
case settled for injunctive relief and attorneys' fees, with no damages for
class members,1 99 suggesting plaintiffs were fearful that the fallout from
Wal-Mart would preclude any recovery at all. Similarly, the lead
plaintiffs' counsel in Velez v. Novartis, °° which involved a $175 million
recovery following a favorable jury verdict, told NPR that his case
would not have succeeded had the Supreme Court's decision been in
place at the time. 20 ' In a third case, Boatright v. Walgreen, the Court
dismissed a class action complaint on its own initiative in light of the
Supreme Court ruling.20 2
Of the eleven completed and ongoing cases lacking distinguishing
features from Wal-Mart, eight were brought against companies listed in
the largest 100 companies in the Fortune 500. By contrast, none of the
winning cases possessing distinguishing features were listed in the
Fortune 500. Notably, at least six similar but losing class actions were
also asserted against the largest 100 companies in the Fortune 500.203 As
194. See ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION REPORT, supranote 128, at 2.
195. See supra Chart 4. The average was skewed by Holloway v. Best Buy, No. C 05-5056
PJH, 2009 WL 1533668 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2009), which consisted of a class of 390,000.
196. See supra Chart 4. The average was skewed by Velez v. Novartis, 244 F.R.D. 243
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), which settled for $175 million.
197. 244 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
198.

See Martinne Geller & Dhanya Skariachan, Best Buy Settles Class-Action Bias Lawsuit,

REUTERS (June 17, 2011, 7:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/17/bestbuy-biaslawsuit-idUSN17272837201 10617; Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2541.
199. Order Confirming Final Certification of Classes and Granting Final Approval to Class
3-4, Holloway v. Best Buy, No.C-05-5056 PJH (MEJ) (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9,
Action Settlement
2011), available at http://www.bbclassaction.com/pdf/20111109-settlement.pdf.
200. No. 10 C 3902,2011 WL 843898 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4,2011).
201.
Totenberg, supra note 6.
202.
See Boatwright v. Walgreen Co., No. 10 C 3902, 2011 WL 843898, at *4 (N.D. 111.Mar.
4,2011). 1 did not list this case in Chart 4.
203.
See, e.g., Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 171 (3d Cir. 2009)
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a result, these companies faced a greater than one in ten chance of being
sued under the same theory as Wal-Mart, a much larger litigation risk
than the average employer. These large employers also faced potential
damages in the tens of millions of dollars, and the likely involvement of
thousands of current employees. By ruling in favor of Wal-Mart, the
Supreme Court effectively removed a substantial penalty levied against
large employers for subjective employment practices that resulted in
statistical disparities.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As described at the outset of this article, the press reacted to the
Wal-Mart decision as a "disaster" for employees. 2°4 My results,
however, suggest that Wal-Mart's effect on employer selection practices
will be more muted than would appear at first blush for several reasons:
(1) it primarily affects the largest employers, who employ a declining
share of the workforce; (2) the largest employers tend not to be the worst
offenders when it comes to legal compliance; and (3) as previously
discussed, the baseline prevalence of these types of claims is so small
that most employers largely ignored the aggregate statistical effect of
their decision-making practices. It is also difficult to assess the public
value of the mega-class actions now precluded by Wal-Mart because the
plaintiffs in those cases were never required to demonstrate the
availability of an alternate selection mechanism that produced a lesser
adverse impact. I argue that altering the burden of proof in disparate
impact cases and a disclosure regime would have a more substantial
impact on employer selection practices than congressional abrogation of
Dukes v. Walmart.
A. Wal-Mart's Effect on Employer Practices Will be Muted
Wal-Mart's primary effect on cases

challenging

subjective

(reversing class certification and remanding on appeal); Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183,
1203-04 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment for employer because statistics failed to
demonstrate practical significance); Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, 467 F. Supp. 2d 403, 414
(D.N.J. 2006) (denying motion for class certification); Lipkins v. 3M Co., No. 4:08CV01512WRW, 2010 WL 3398426, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 26, 2010) (dismissing for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies); Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 F.R.D. 450, 468 (N.D. 1ll. 2009) (denying
class certification for failure to establish commonality); Anderson v. Boeing Co., 222 F.R.D. 521,
554 (N.D. Okla. 2004) (decertifying one subclass and granting summary judgment for employer on
remaining subclass).
204. See, e.g., Totenberg, supra note 6.
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employment practices will be increased difficulty in suing the very
largest employers in the United States. This renders its effect more
muted than would appear at first blush. Fortune 500 companies employ
a decreasing share of the population, from 18% twenty years ago in the
1980s to less than 10% as of 1999.205 Moreover, the very largest
employers represent only a small fraction of employers overall.
Employers with less than 500 employees represent 99.7% of all
employers in the United States,20 6 a class size much more likely to
survive the more exacting standards set forth in Wal-Mart.
While the largest corporations represent easy targets for large class
actions, they are not necessarily the worst offenders. Social science
research suggests that larger organizations were the earliest adopters of
internal grievance procedures,20 7 as well as antidiscrimination policies
and protocols. Consistent with this finding, the smaller class actions
depicted in Chart 4 were based upon much more concerning fact patterns
than cases alleged against larger employers.
For example, Wright v. Stern20 8 involved a New York City parks
commissioner with unilateral authority to determine compensation, who
209
Plaintiffs produced
was also involved in promotion decisions.
evidence of various race-based remarks by the commissioner, including,
"[y]ou look black, but when you talk, I know you're Jewish," asking an
African American employee who complained about the denial of a
promotion "whether he was a drug addict or drank on the job," and
attributing the absence of African Americans in managerial positions to
"the smaller number of blacks who are able to perform managerial
positions. ''210 The commissioner's decision-making produced very large
disparities in pay and promotions, with African Americans representing
92% of employees making less than $20,000 but only 13% of those
making more than $70,000.211 White employees were also awarded 70%
of promotions while representing only 50% of the park workforce.212
High-level parks employees also admitted to assigning employees to

205. Frank Elwell, An Essay on the Rationalization of the Work Place, in INDUSTRIALIZING
AMERICA 75, 75 (1999).
206. Derek Leebaert, How Small Businesses Contribute to US. Economic Expansion,
AMERICA.GOV

ARCHirE--(Jan.

3,

2006),

http://www.america.gov/st/econ-

english/2008/July/20080814223926XJyrreP0.615597.html.
207.

John R. Sutton et al., The Legalizationof the Workplace, 99 AM. J. SOC. 944, 962 (1994).

208.

450 F. Supp. 2d 335 (S.D.N.Y 2006).

209.
210.
211.
212.

Wright v. Stem, 450 F. Supp. 2d 335, 351-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id.at 349.
Id.at347.
Id.at357.
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neighborhoods on the basis of race.2 13
In another geographically limited class action, Duling v. Gristede's
OperatingCorp.,214 women at a New York City grocery store chain were
channeled into the cashier position, which presented very few
advancement opportunities. 2 5 The employer had no employment
policies in place, and all human resources functions were managed by a
single individual with no prior work experience and no training on antidiscrimination laws.216 The disparities were highly statistically and
practically significant, where the plaintiffs expert calculated that gender
neutral job assignments would have placed 1,038 women into positions
other than cashier. 1 7
By contrast, the mega class actions tended to allege only large
disparities combined with delegated decision-making, without much in
the way of anecdotal or circumstantial evidence. 2 8 These cases also
tended to rely on expert testimony to establish commonality, perhaps to
fill in the absence of a compelling or commonsense narrative as to how
the disparities occurred. 2 19 Had more damaging facts been available,
particularly facts relating to company-wide practices or admissions, the
plaintiffs surely would have cited such evidence. The relative scarcity of
anecdotal and circumstantial evidence on support of cases against very
large companies suggests that they were not necessarily the worst actors,
but were attractive litigation targets for other reasons, such as the
potential for large class sizes with commensurately large damages, and
the ease of generating statistically significant results from large
employee pools.

213. Id. at 354-55.
214. 265 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
215. Id. at 95.
216. Id. at 89, 98.
217. Id. at92.
218. See Ellis v. Costco, 657 F.3d 970, 977, 986 (9th Cir. 2011) (promotion class action based
on subjective practices influenced by gender stereotypes); Bell v. Lockheed Martin, 244 F.R.D. 186,
191 (D.N.J. 2011) (disparate impact claim based upon word of mouth promotions); Holloway v.
Best Buy, No. C-05-5056, 2009 WL 1533668, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May, 28 2009) (class action based
on subjective decision-making); Velez v. Novartis, 244 F.R.D. 243, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (class
action based on subjective evaluation practices that were "vulnerable to bias"); Carlson v. CH
Robinson, No. 02-3780, 2003 WL 758602, at *8 (D. Minn. Mar. 31,2005) (compensation class
based on "unfettered discretion .. coupled with the absence of objective factors").
219. See Ellis, 657 F.3d at 980 (relying on expert testimony); Velez, 244 F.R.D. at 258-59
(relying on expert testimony).
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B. The Public Value of Mega Class Actions ChallengingSubjective
Employment is Difficult to Assess
Assessing the public value of the large class actions precluded by
Wal-Mart is difficult because the plaintiff in each case was never
required to show that an alternate selection mechanism was available
that would produce a lesser adverse impact.
The ordinary burden allocation in disparate impact claims is that the
plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case - consisting of a statistical
disparity and evidence that a particular employment practice caused that
disparity. 220 The employer can then assert an affirmative defense that
the challenged practice is job related and consistent with business
necessity.2
Where the employer successfully presents its defense, the
plaintiff must show that an alternate selection method would produce a
lesser impact while still serving the employer's legitimate business
interests.222
The affirmative defense is routinely asserted in disparate impact
cases challenging objective tests. Indeed, defendants have been so
aggressive in doing so in testing cases, that plaintiffs' success rates in
such cases has fallen over time. 223 However, in cases challenging
subjective employment practices, the affirmative defense is almost never
asserted.224 This may partly be a function of cases being settled at the
certification stage, rather than on the merits - the affirmative defense
would not arise in the context of a certification motion. Nevertheless,
many cases reached the summary judgment stage, with no mention of
the affirmative defense. My sample included only one case where the
court made reference to an employer having asserted the
defense, which
225
apparently consisted of one line in the employer's brief.
One unfortunate consequence of the employer's failure to assert an
affirmative defense in subjective cases, is that the plaintiff is never
220. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
221. Id. at 997.
222.

See id. at 998.

223. See Selmi, supranote 20 at 742.
224. Employers fail to assert the defense in subjective cases even though the Supreme Court in
Watson suggested that employers may proffer evidence short of validation in their affirmative
defense of subjective practices. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 1006-07. The concurring opinion opined
that the EEOC's Uniform Guidelines "may sometimes not be effective in measuring the jobrelatedness of subjective selection processes .... " Id. See also Bartholet, supra note 146, at 1010
(noting the difficulty associated with validating subjective practices).
225. Grant v. Nashville, 727 F. Supp. 2d 677, 703 (M.D. Tenn. 2010), order rev'd by 446 Fed.
App'x 737 (6th Cir. 2011).
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required to demonstrate that an alternative selection mechanism would
create a lesser adverse impact. This last stage of burden shifting,
however, is critically important from a policy perspective. If there is no
preferable alternative to a subjective practice - if other selection
mechanisms produce equal or greater impact - then the case offers little
by way of public value.226 It is a wrong with no practical remedy.
For this reason, it is a mistake to identify subjective practices as the
scourge of the modern workplace. 7 Labeling subjective practices as
the problem fails to take into accounts the costs and benefits of the
alternative: testing and other objective metrics. One prominent expert
witness recently testified before the EEOC that while "some tests had
less adverse impact than others", years of research showed that "the
average score for minority applicants
was almost always lower than that
228
of non-minority applicants.,

Indeed, the Supreme Court expressed considerable ambivalence in
its 1982 Watson decision that made subjective practices subject to
challenge,229 perhaps reflecting a historical context where objective tests
were more commonly the source of statistical disparities and represented
a significant barrier towards equal employment opportunity. While the
current imagined alternative to subjective practices is a selection
mechanism that is race and gender neutral, the actual alternative could
be greater adverse impact, or at best, somewhat less adverse impact. For
all their drawbacks, subjective practices also promise a nuanced form of
226. The notion that an outcome should only be evaluated in the context of its alternatives
comes from negotiation theory. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GET7ING TO YES 99-100 (2d
ed. 1991) ("When a family is deciding on the minimum price for their house, the right question to
ask is not what they 'ought' to be able to get, but what they will do if by a certain time they have not
sold the house ....What is your BATNA - your Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement?
That is the standard against which any proposed agreement should be measured.").
227. 1 am not arguing that subjective practices are always preferable to other selection
mechanisms, but rather that selection practices are neither inherently good nor inherently bad. They
are only better or worse than the alternatives available in a particular context, depending on the
adverse impact each mechanism imposes, and its predictability of success on the job.
228. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Meeting of May 16, 2007 -Employment Testing and
Screening:
Statement
of
James
L.
Outtz
(May
16,
2007),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/archive/5-16-07/outtz.html. See also Selmi, supra note 20, at
705 (arguing that "disparate impact theory has produced no substantial social change. . . as the vast
majority of tests continue to have significant adverse impact.")
229. In Watson the Supreme Court took pains to point out that "an employer's policy of
leaving promotion decisions to the unchecked discretion of lower level supervisors should itself
raise no inference of discriminatory conduct." Watson, 487 U.S. at 990. It was therefore concerned
that allowing employees to challenge subjective criteria "could put undue pressure on employers to
adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures" creating "a Hobson's choice for employers ... where
quotas and preferential treatment become the only cost-effective means of avoiding expensive
litigation and potentially catastrophic liability ....
" Id.at 992-93.
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fairness that the non-negotiable results of an objective test cannot
provide.
A telling example of this problem is illustrated by a case the EEOC
brought against Wal-Mart in 1998, alleging a pattern or practice of
discrimination against female applicants to its Kentucky warehouse
based upon Wal-Mart's subjective decision-making practices.2 30 The
case was sufficiently similar to Dukes v. Wal-Mart that the EEOC even
hired the same social science expert, William Bielby, to testify that
gender stereotyping was a "compelling" reason for the alleged statistical
disparities. 231 The lawsuit settled in 2010, through a consent decree in
which Wal-Mart agreed to hire class members as positions opened,
"subject to the criteria that is applicable for all new hires in the...
position. 232
Following the entry of the consent decree, Wal-Mart simply altered
its hiring criteria by imposing two tests for all applicants - a physical
abilities test, and a logistics test, measuring "safety awareness, integrity,
and decision-making skills. ' 233 Nearly a year later, Wal-Mart had not
hired a single class member, and the EEOC sued to enforce the consent
decree on the basis that Wal-Mart had implemented the tests to avoid
hiring class members.234 In light of language in the consent decree
permitting Wal-Mart to implement "criteria... applicable for all new
hires," the Court refused to intervene.235
C. Alternate Approaches to Regulation
As a matter of policy, should Congress override the Supreme
Court's ruling, much as it did to the Wards Cove decision in its 1991
amendment to Title VII? 236 First, abrogating Wal-Mart would not
address the question of whether lawsuits challenging subjective
employment practices improve upon the status quo. That would require
altering the existing burden shifting framework in disparate impact
cases.
230. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart, 156 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 1998).
231. See Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2549 (2011).
232. EEOC v. Wal-Mart, No. 6:01-CV-339-KKC, 2011 WL 42997, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 16,
2001).
233. Id. at *2.
234. See id. at * 1. The EEOC did not bring a separate disparate impact claim, presumably
because it assumed the consent decree would provide an adequate and more easily obtained remedy.
235. Id. at *4.
236. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
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Second, if the purpose of reform is to encourage employers to
reexamine their subjective practices, simply overturning Wal-Mart
would not reliably alter employer behavior. As discussed in Section V
above, cases challenging subjective practices prior to the Wal-Mart
decision were so rare that they did not pose an effective litigation risk
for all but the very largest employers. Making such claims more
prevalent would require addressing information asymmetries that
prevent employees from identifying aggregate disparities in hiring, pay,
promotion and termination.
1. Altering the Burden of Proof in Cases Challenging Subjective
Employment Practices
Wal-Mart has effectively ruled out certification for any disparate
impact or pattern or practice claims based solely on disparities caused by
the delegation of subjective decision-making. This shift creates a safe
haven for large employers seeking to avoid litigation through benign
neglect of their employment practices, making standardless decisionmaking a 'best practice.' As the plaintiff s bar argued in an amicus brief
to the Supreme Court in the Wal-Mart decision, "[i]f claims involving
objective criteria are easier to certify than those involving subjective
from
criteria, the likely result is that employers will move further away
237
objective measures ofjob performance, skills, or qualifications.
A preferable framework would make subjective practices based on
delegated decision-making neither easier nor more difficult to challenge
than other employment practices. Overturning Wal-Mart would not
necessarily fix the problem. Because employers almost always assert
their affirmative defense in cases challenging objective practices but
almost never asserted the defense in cases challenging subjective
And as
practices, subjective practices became easier to litigate.
described above, the affirmative defense serves a useful public function
in assessing whether the law offers a practical remedy for the disparity.
Rather than abrogating Wal-Mart, Congress could simply permit
plaintiffs challenging subjective employment practices to establish
commonality through a common remedy - an alternative selection
mechanism that is job related but has a lesser adverse impact. The
employer, for its part, would retain its original affirmative defense that
its subjective practices are job related and consistent with business
237. Brief for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 15, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 10-277).
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necessity, as well as a defense that the proposed alternative is neither job
related nor consistent with its business needs.238 This would place
plaintiffs challenging subjective and objective practices in equivalent
legal positions.
With respect to "pattern or practice" claims, which Wal-Mart also
rendered nearly impossible to allege in the case of large class actions
challenging wholly subjective criteria, discriminatory animus could be
shown through knowledge of a disparate impact and a failure to
investigate or alter its practices. Under this method of proof, the
employer's reasonable and good faith efforts to identify alternative
selection mechanisms and either failure to find one or its decision to
implement that alternative mechanism, would serve as an affirmative
defense. Like the affirmative defense set forth in Faragherv. Boca
Raton,239 where an employer can avoid vicarious liability for harassment
through a good faith investigation and attempt to remedy the
harassment,240 such an affirmative defense would be intended to
encourage employer vigilance. Under this framework, knowledge could
be established through employee complaints, demand letters, EEOC
investigations or other means. Periodic adverse impact analyses with
reasonable efforts to identify and implement alternatives would support
an employer defense.
Arguably, such a framework for "pattern or practice" claims
represented the state of the law prior to Wal-Mart, at least in the Eighth
Circuit. In EEOC v. Dial,24' the Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict in
a pattern or practice claim, where discriminatory animus was proved
through evidence that the employer knew of the disparate impact
associated with a weightlifting test but continued to use it.242 The
addition of an affirmative defense would serve to encourage employers
to take a proactive, rather than a "head in the sand," approach.
The burden-shifting framework would be preferable to the status
quo because it would neither encourage nor discourage employers from
adopting subjective employment practices. Employers would still be
able to make use of subjective practices, subject to their due diligence, to
238. Consistent with Watson, the employer would not need to use a validation test to establish
this defense. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1006-07 (1988), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074. Rather, the "proper means
of establishing business necessity will vary with the type and size of the business in question, as
well as the particular job for which the selection process is employed." Id. at 1007.
239. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
240.

See id. at 807-08.

241.
242.

469 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 738-39.
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find a less impactful alternative in the event they learn it has caused an
adverse impact. For their part, employees would still have a remedy
available to challenge wholly subjective practices.
2. A Disclosure-Based Approach
Abrogating Wal-Mart would not address the low baseline
prevalence of cases challenging subjective employment practices.
Employees affected by an employer's aggregate practices rarely have
more than an anecdotal understanding of ongoing statistical disparities;
indeed, the employer may not even be aware of its own statistical
disparities. Increasing the prevalence of disparate impact claims would
require addressing this informational asymmetry, perhaps through
stricter enforcement of existing recordkeeping requirements 243 and a
disclosure mandate. 2 "
A disclosure mandate could come in various forms. It could, for
example, require employers to conduct periodic adverse impact analyses
and report their results to the EEOC. The EEOC could then investigate
and, where appropriate, bring an enforcement action against the worst
offenders rather than having to rely on employee complaints.
More aggressive disclosure regimes could require disclosure to the
employees themselves.
For example, such information could be
required to be disclosed upon request, much like a California law
requiring the employer to disclose the contents of an employee's
personnel file upon request. 245

While such requests would most

commonly be made by employees at the behest of their attorneys, it
nevertheless would provide a means for parties to test the merits of a
potential disparate impact claim prior to filing a lawsuit and extensive
discovery.
Another disclosure regime could consist of mandated disclosure to
affected employees.246 For example, just as wage and hour laws require
247
employers to disclose an employee's overtime premium on pay stubs,
regulations could also require disclosure of statistical disparities in pay
243. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures already require employers to
keep records of the statistical effect of their employee selection procedures. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4
(2011).
244.

See generally Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: Toward Workplace Transparency, 63

STAN. L. REv. 351 (2011) (discussing using disclosure regimes to regulate employment contexts).
245. See CAL. LAB. § 1198.5(a)-(c) (West 2011).
246. Alternatively, disclosure to employees could be structured as the penalty imposed by the
EEOC for adverse impacts an employee fails to address after a particular grace period.
247. See, e.g., CAL. LAB.§ 226(a) (West 2011); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195(3) (McKinney 2011).
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on pay stubs. A disclosure rule could also be structured like the federal
Fair Credit Reporting Act, which requires employers to notify an
employee when his or her credit served as a basis for retracting a job
248
offer, and furnish a credit report serving as a basis for that retraction.
An approach intended to address statistical disparities in hiring could
consist of a notification to job applicants that they have been rejected,
any statistical disparities accompanying the selection, and the selection
criteria. The Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act already mandates a
similar type of disclosure where an employer
seeks to obtain a release
249
from a terminated employee older than forty.
A disclosure regime would have the added benefit of forcing
employers to monitor the statistical impact of their employment
practices, and encouraging them to consider alternative selection
mechanisms where large and persistent disparities occur. It could,
however, also impose considerable time and expense on the part of
employers, particularly smaller employers lacking a sophisticated human
resources department.
Disclosure regimes also involve divulging

confidential information; compensation information in particular is often
treated with secrecy. 250 Any disclosure mandate would therefore need to
be crafted with care; taking into account whether the potential benefits to
employees justify the additional burdens placed upon employers.2 5'
VII. CONCLUSION

In years hence, it may be tempting to attribute the prevalence of

subjective employment practices and the paucity of litigation
248. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A), 1681(m)(a) (2006).
249. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(a)(5), (f)(l) (2011). The existence of OWBPA's disclosure
requirement has not spawned a large number of class actions challenging termination decisions on
the basis of age. This could signal that disclosure regimes are not as effective as one might hope. It
could also be attributable to factors unrelated to the efficacy of the disclosure requirement. The
Supreme Court did not recognize disparate impact claims based upon age until 2005. See Smith v.
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). Because OWBPA's disclosures are only required in the
context of a release, class size can be considerably eroded by potential members who ultimately
choose to release their claims in exchange for severance. The disclosure requirement may,
however, result in increased severance offers to a larger pool of laid off works.
250. See Estlund, supra note 244 at 391-94 (discussing when an employer's policy of
confidentiality may be justified).
251. As articulated in Watson, it would be important to avoid a regulatory structure so
burdensome that it would put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic
measures" creating "a Hobson's choice for employers ... where quotas and preferential treatment
become the only cost-effective means of avoiding expensive litigation and potentially catastrophic
liability ..." Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992-93 (1988), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
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challenging them to Dukes v. Wal-Mart. However, as my research
suggests, such litigation was very uncommon even prior to the Supreme
Court's decision, with only the largest corporations facing a significant
risk of being sued for their subjective practices. Moreover, because
these mega-class actions did not force the plaintiff to prove the
availability of an alternate selection mechanism with a lesser adverse
impact, the extent to which such litigation advanced public interests is
unknown. Encouraging employers to carefully scrutinize and improve
upon their employment selection practices would require reforms
beyond abrogating the Wal-Mart decision.
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